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GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	
Naomi	Schoenbaum*	
ABSTRACT	While	 the	 sharing	 economy	 has	 been	 celebrated	 as	 a	 flexible	alternative	 to	 traditional	 employment	 for	 those	 with	 family	responsibilities,	 especially	 women,	 it	 presents	 challenges	 for	 gender	equality.		 Many	 of	 the	 services	 that	 are	 “shared”	 take	 place	 in	 the	context	 of	 intimacy,	 which	 can	 have	 substantial	 consequences	 for	transacting,	 particularly	 by	 enhancing	 the	 importance	 of	 identity	 of	both	the	worker	and	the	customer.		Expanding	on	previous	research	on	intimate	work—a	critical	area	that	exists	largely	in	limbo	between	the	law	of	the	market	and	the	law	of	the	family—this	Article	explores	the	significance	 of	 intimacy	 in	 the	 sharing	 economy	 and	 the	 implications	for	its	regulation	of	the	sharing	economy	and	for	sex	equality.		It	argues	that	the	intimacy	of	many	sharing	economy	transactions	heightens	the	salience	of	sex	to	these	transactions,	in	tension	with	sex	discrimination	law’s	goal	of	reducing	the	salience	of	sex	in	the	labor	market.		But	even	if	 existing	 sex	 discrimination	 law	 extends	 to	 these	 transactions,	 the	intimacy	 of	 the	 transactions	 again	 limits	 the	 law’s	 ability	 to	 promote	gender	 equality	 in	 the	 same	 transformative	 way	 that	 it	 has	 in	 the	traditional	 economy.	 	 The	 sharing	 economy	 thus	 raises	 serious	concerns	for	proponents	of	sex	equality.			
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INTRODUCTION	The	 sharing	 economy	 has	 been	 hailed	 as	 a	 job	 creator	 and	celebrated	 for	 offering	 flexibility	 that	 can	 benefit	 all	 workers,	 but	especially	 women.1	 Much	 of	 the	 language	 used	 to	 describe	 the	possibilities	 of	 the	 sharing	 economy	 for	workers	 is	 that	 of	 liberation	from	 the	 confines	 of	 the	 traditional	workaday	world	 and	 freedom	 to	create	 one’s	 own	 productive	 experience,	which	might	 be	 particularly	important	 to	 women	 workers,	 who	 have	 historically	 been	shortchanged	when	it	comes	to	the	rewards	of	work.2		Specifically,	the	
                                                                                                             
	 1.	 See	Natasha	 Singer,	 In	 the	 Sharing	 Economy,	Workers	 Find	 Both	 Freedom	 and	
Uncertainty,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Aug.	 16,	 2014),	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?_r=0	 [https://perma.cc/K67H-AHHW].	
	 2.	 Id.;	see	also	Paul	Merrion,	Making	 Inroads:	Women	Cabbies	on	 the	Rise,	CRAIN’S	CHICAGO	 BUSINESS	 (Sept.	 27,	 2014),	
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2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 3	idea	 that	work	 can	 be	 done	 largely	 outside	 of	 a	 standard	workplace,	and	often	at	home	 (either	 the	worker’s	 or	 the	 customer’s),	 and	be	 fit	into	small	parcels	of	a	worker’s	time,	has	been	seen	to	be	a	particularly	good	 fit	 for	workers	with	 significant	 family	 care	 responsibilities,	who	are	overwhelmingly	women.3		The	sharing	economy’s	merging	of	home	and	work	harkens	back	to	an	earlier	era	when	women	were	less	likely	to	labor	in	a	formal	workplace,	and	more	likely	to	work	from	their	own	or	 someone	 else’s	 home.4	 	 Even	 the	 term	 “sharing”	 suggests	 the	traditionally	 feminine	 value	 of	 cooperation	 over	 the	 traditionally	masculine	 value	 of	 competition.5	 	 In	 light	 of	 this	 seeming	 synergy	between	 women	 workers	 and	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 is	 the	 sharing	economy	in	fact	a	boon	to	women’s	equality?6	
                                                                                                             http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSUE01/309279976/making-inroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise	[https://perma.cc/3W77-B973].	
	 3.	 Id.	
	 4.	 See	Dorothy	E.	Roberts,	Spiritual	and	Menial	Housework,	9	YALE	J.	LAW	&	FEMINISM	51,	 54	 (1997)	 (describing	 how	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 to	 twentieth	 century,	“[k]eeping	boarders	was	a	lucrative	source	of	income	for	women,”	and	how	women	at	this	time	“engaged	in	industrial	home	work,	doing	paid	piecework	in	their	homes,	such	as	sewing	garments,	typing	documents,	or	rolling	cigars”).		 5.	 Mary	 Anne	 Case,	Disaggregating	 Gender	 from	 Sex	 and	 Sexual	 Orientation:	 The	
Effeminate	Man	 in	 the	 Law	 and	 Feminist	 Jurisprudence,	 105	 YALE	 L.J.	 1,	 71-73,	 98-99	(1995)	 (referencing	 sources	 that	 type	 competition	 as	 a	 masculine	 value	 and	cooperation	as	a	feminine	value).		 6.	 This	 is	 an	 especially	 important	 question	 for	 urban	 areas,	 where	 the	 bulk	 of	sharing	economy	activity	takes	place.	 	See	Nestor	M.	Davidson	&	John	J.	 Infranca,	The	
Sharing	 Economy	 as	 an	 Urban	 Phenomenon,	 34	 YALE	 L.	 &	 POL’Y	 REV.	 ___	 (forthcoming	2016)	 (arguing	 that	 the	 sharing	 economy	 “is	 fundamentally	 an	 urban	 phenomenon”	due	to	the	“density,	proximity,	specialization,	and	even	anonymity	that	mark	city	life”);	Daniel	E.	Rauch	&	David	Schleicher,	Like	Uber,	but	 for	Local	Governmental	Policy:	The	
Future	of	Local	Regulation	of	the	“Sharing	Economy,”	George	Mason	University	Law	and	Economics	 Research	 Paper	 Series	 15-01,	 at	 5,	http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1501.pdf	[https://perma.cc/JX67-L6FK]	(highlighting	how	the	density	of	urban	spaces	underlies	the	 sharing	 economy).	 	 In	 this	 way,	 this	 Article	 contributes	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 the	relationship	between	gender	and	geography.		See,	e.g.,	Lisa	Pruitt,	Gender,	Geography	&	
Rural	Justice,	23	BERKELEY	J.	GENDER,	L.	&	JUSTICE	338	(2008)	(arguing	that	geography	is	important	 for	 understanding	 gender	 equality	 and	 focusing	 specifically	 on	 the	 issues	that	face	rural	women);	Naomi	Schoenbaum,	Mobility	Measures,	2012	BYU	L.	REV.	1165,	1227-31	(arguing	that	urban	spaces	can	enhance	gender	equality	by	providing	greater	density	of	labor	market	opportunities	for	both	husband	and	wife,	reducing	the	need	for	long-distance	 moves	 that	 tend	 to	 negatively	 affect	 women’s	 workplace	 equality);	Katharine	 B.	 Silbaugh,	 Women’s	 Place:	 Urban	 Planning,	 Housing	 Design,	 and	 Work-
Family	 Balance,	 76	 FORDHAM	 L.	 REV.	 1797,	 1826	 (2007)	 (arguing	 that	 suburban	sprawl—the	 increasing	 distance	 between	 home	 and	 work—hinders	 women’s	workplace	 equality	 due	 to	 longer	 commute	 times	 that	 not	 only	 impact	 the	 ability	 to	balance	 work	 and	 family	 but	 also	 tend	 to	 disproportionately	 limit	 women’s	 job	opportunities	 and	 suggesting	 that	 denser	 urban	 areas	 can	 thus	 enhance	 women’s	equality).		This	Article	helps	to	highlight	the	complex	relationship	between	geography	and	gender	equality.		On	the	one	hand,	by	providing	a	dense	labor	market	that	reduces	
4	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	While	the	regulation	of	the	sharing	economy	has	received	scholarly	attention,	 little	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 the	 question	 of	 identity	 in	the	sharing	economy,	and	especially	to	gender.7		Within	this	literature,	scholars	 disagree	 on	 how	 much—if	 at	 all—the	 sharing	 economy	changes	the	regulatory	landscape	across	several	areas	of	law.8		Much	of	the	 existing	 scholarship	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 descriptive	 question	 of	whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 current	 law	 governs	 sharing	 economy	transactions.9	 	 But	 this	 focus	 tends	 to	 sidestep	 the	 critical	 normative	consideration	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 applying	 existing	 regulation	 to	this	 changed	 context,	 including	 whether	 existing	 law	will	 achieve	 its	aims	when	applied	 in	 these	 sometimes	quite	different	 circumstances.		This	Article	concerns	itself	with	this	consideration	in	the	context	of	sex	discrimination	law	and	sex	equality.	Building	on	prior	work	on	intimate	work,10	this	Article	explains	how	the	intimate	nature	of	much	of	the	transacting	in	the	sharing	economy	
                                                                                                             the	need	for	long-distance	moves	and	for	long	commutes,	urban	spaces	alleviate	some	of	the	work-family	tensions	that	contribute	to	women’s	lack	of	labor	market	equality.		
See	Schoenbaum,	Mobility	Measures,	 supra,	 at	 1227-31;	 Silbaugh,	 supra,	 at	 1826.	 	On	the	other	hand,	as	this	Article	explores,	 if	 the	sharing	economy	takes	hold	even	more	strongly	as	a	source	of	work	in	cities,	urban	spaces	may	exacerbate	the	salience	of	sex	at	work,	undermining	women’s	labor	market	equality.	
	 7.	 See,	e.g.,	id.;	Brishen	Rogers,	The	Social	Costs	of	Uber,	82	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	DIALOGUE	85	 (2015),	https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Rogers_Dialogue.pdf	[https://perma.cc/2322-AKWG];	Deborah	F.	Buckman,	Liability	
and	 Regulation	 of	 Ride-Sharing	 Services	 Using	 Social	 Media,	 6	 A.L.R.	 7th	 Art.	 1	 (June	2015);	 Molly	 Cohen	 &	 Corey	 Zehngebot,	 What’s	 Old	 Becomes	 New:	 Regulating	 the	
Sharing	 Economy,	 BOSTON	 B.J.	 (Spring	 2014),	https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-the-sharing-economy/	 [https://perma.cc/R7KT-XDAF];	 Catherine	 Lee	 Rassman,	
Regulating	Rideshare	Without	Stifling	Innovation:	Examining	the	Drivers,	The	Insurance	
“Gap”,	 and	 Why	 Pennsylvania	 Should	 Get	 on	 Board,	 15	 U.	 PITT.	 J.	 TECH.	 L.	 &	 POL’Y	 81	(2014).	
	 8.	 Compare,	e.g.,	Shu-Yi	Oei	&	Diane	M.	Ring,	Can	Sharing	Be	Taxed?,	93	WASH.	U.	L.	REV.	 ___	 (forthcoming	 2016),	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570584	[https://perma.cc/A438-B45Q]	 (arguing	 in	 the	 tax	 context	 that	 current	 law	 is	adequate	to	regulate	the	sharing	economy),	with	Abbey	Steimer,	Betwix	and	Between:	Regulating	the	Sharing	Economy,	43	FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 ___	 (forthcoming	 2016),	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656	[https://perma.cc/BC5V-AF47]	(arguing	that	the	sharing	economy	“does	not	fit	within	existing	legal	frameworks”).		 9.	 An	important	exception	includes	Sofia	Ranchordas,	Does	Sharing	Mean	Caring?	
Regulating	 Innovation	 in	 the	 Sharing	 Economy,	 16	 MINN.	 J.L.	 SCI.	 &	 TECH	 1	 (2015),	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492798	[https://perma.cc/QXK3-EFUT].		 10.	 Naomi	Schoenbaum,	The	Law	of	Intimate	Work,	90	WASH.	L.	REV.	1167	(2015).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 5	heightens	the	salience	of	sex	to	both	buyers	and	sellers	there.	 	This	is	troubling	 for	 the	 legal	 sex	 equality	 project,	whose	 goal	 has	 generally	been	to	make	sex	less	salient	in	the	market.11		And,	importantly,	simply	extending	existing	sex	discrimination	law	to	the	sharing	economy	may	not	alleviate	these	troubles.	As	 transactions	 increasingly	 occur	 in	 a	 space	 that	 blurs	 the	traditional	distinctions	of	home	and	market,	not	only	is	the	salience	of	sex	heightened,	but	also	the	law’s	ability	to	address	it	is	cabined.12		So	even	 if	 sex	 discrimination	 law	 applies	 to	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 the	more	 intimate	nature	of	 these	transactions—and	the	consequences	of	intimacy	for	the	operation	of	this	law—limits	the	law’s	ability	to	have	the	 transformative	effect	 that	 it	has	had	 in	 the	 traditional	economy.13		While	some	may	celebrate	a	realm	of	market	transactions	with	greater	freedom	 to	 express	 intimate	 preferences,	 this	 expanded	 realm	 of	freedom	risks	undermining	 the	project	of	 sex	equality	by	reifying	 the	salience	of	sex	in	the	market.	While	 this	 Article	 raises	 concerns	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 sharing	economy	 for	 women’s	 equality,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 read	 as	 a	condemnation	of	 the	sharing	economy	 in	general	or	even	 for	women.		Surely,	 the	 sharing	 economy	 enhances	 utility,	 including	 women’s	utility,	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways.	 	 More	 analysis	 is	 required	 to	 assess	 on	balance	the	impact	of	the	sharing	economy	on	women’s	welfare.	 	This	Article	 is	 meant	 only	 as	 a	 first	 intervention	 to	 raise	 some	 of	 the	challenges	that	the	sharing	economy	presents	for	gender	equality.	This	Article	proceeds	in	three	parts.		In	Part	I,	this	Article	sets	forth	the	 case	 for	 the	 heightened	 significance	 of	 identity	 in	 the	 sharing	economy	based	on	the	intimacy	of	the	transactions	that	occur	there.		It	begins	by	explaining	how	transactions	in	the	sharing	economy	take	on	a	 more	 intimate	 cast	 than	 transactions	 in	 the	 traditional	 economy.		First,	 the	 place	 of	 sharing	 economy	 transactions	 confers	 intimacy.		Sharing	economy	transactions	often	transcend	the	boundaries	of	home	and	 market	 in	 that	 they	 occur	 in	 a	 seller’s	 or	 buyer’s	 private	 space.		
                                                                                                             
	 11.	 See	generally	Vicki	Schultz,	Taking	Sex	Discrimination	Seriously,	91	DENVER	UNIV.	L.	 REV.	 995	 (2015)	 (arguing	 that	 the	 success	 of	 employment	 discrimination	 law	 in	promoting	sex	equality	in	the	market	has	been	due	to	reducing	the	salience	of	sex	by	challenging	 essentialist	 notions	 of	 sex	 difference);	 infra	note	 102	 and	 accompanying	text.	
	 12.	 See	infra	Part	I.A.1.	
	 13.	 See	 Janet	 Nadler	 &	 Kenworthey	 Bilz,	Law,	 Psychology,	 and	Morality,	 in	MORAL	COGNITION	 AND	 DECISION	 MAKING:	 THE	 PSYCHOLOGY	 OF	 LEARNING	 AND	 MOTIVATION	 101	 (D.	Medin,	 et	 al.,	 eds.,	 2009);	 John	 J.	 Donohue	 III	 &	 James	 Heckman,	 Continuous	 Versus	
Episodic	Change:	The	Impact	of	Civil	Rights	Policy	on	the	Economic	Status	of	Blacks,	29	J.	ECON.	LIT.	1603	(1991).	
6	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	Second,	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 rely	 on	 intimacy	 as	 a	 risk-reducing	mechanism	 that	 confers	 trust.	 	 This	 intimacy	 then	 magnifies	 the	significance	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 to	 a	 transaction.		Identity	traits	serve	as	powerful	signals	of	the	type	of	services	a	seller	provides	 or	 the	 type	 of	 customer	 the	 buyer	 will	 be,	 and	 intimacy	intensifies	 preferences	 for	 the	 types	 of	 traits	 that	 identity	 signals.		Sharing	economy	firms’	personalization	of	transactions	only	heightens	the	significance	of	buyers’	and	sellers’	identities,	and	the	private	spaces	in	 which	 much	 of	 the	 transacting	 occurs	 allow	 discriminatory	preferences	to	flourish	largely	unchecked.	In	Part	II,	this	Article	turns	to	focus	specifically	on	the	salience	of	sex	in	the	sharing	economy.		This	Part	begins	by	looking	at	sex	preferences	in	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 and	 identifies	 four	 interests	 that	 underlie	these	preferences:	privacy	interests;	preferences	for	comfort	and	even	pleasure;	 the	desire	 for	a	space	free	of	sexuality;	and	safety	concerns.		This	Part	then	catalogs	the	various	manifestations	of	the	salience	of	sex	in	 the	 sharing	economy.	 	 From	discrimination	 to	 segregation,	what	 is	perhaps	 most	 notable	 about	 these	 manifestations	 is	 how	 often	 they	take	the	form	of	express	sex-based	preferences	or	distinctions,	rather	than	 the	 sorts	 of	 unconscious	 biases	 and	 subtle	 discrimination	 that	have	 dominated	 much	 recent	 scholarship	 on	 discrimination.14	 	 This	suggests	that	our	norms	do	not	yet	consider	sex-based	discrimination	in	market	 transactions	 that	are	marked	by	 intimate	or	social	 features	to	be	overly	problematic.	In	Part	 III,	 this	Article	 looks	at	 the	 consequences	of	 the	 salience	of	sex	in	the	sharing	economy.		The	increasing	blurring	of	home	and	work	that	 the	 sharing	 economy	 creates	 presents	 challenges	 for	 legal	regulation	 and	 the	 goals	 of	 sex	 equality.	 	 This	 Part	 begins	 with	 a	normative	evaluation	of	the	salience	of	sex	in	the	sharing	economy.		It	considers	both	the	promise	and	the	threat	of	 this	phenomenon	to	the	larger	goals	of	 the	sex	equality	project	of	 the	market,	 concluding	 that	the	threat	outweighs	the	promise.	 	Part	III	then	assesses	the	ability	of	existing	 law	to	combat	 the	salience	of	 sex	 in	 the	sharing	economy.	 	 It	first	addresses	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	application	of	existing	sex	discrimination	 law	to	 the	sharing	economy.	 	 It	 then	explores	how	the	 market	 has	 responded	 in	 the	 face	 of	 this	 legal	 uncertainty	 and	concludes	that	market	responses	alone	have	thus	far	been	inadequate	to	 constrain	 the	 salience	 of	 sex	 in	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 and	 indeed	have	often	had	the	opposite	effect.	 	Even	if	current	antidiscrimination	laws	 were	 to	 apply	 to	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 the	 intimacy	 and	 other	
                                                                                                             
	 14.	 See	sources	cited	infra	note	20.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 7	structural	 features	 of	 sharing-economy	 transactions	 would	 sharply	limit	the	promise	of	such	laws	to	have	the	transformative	effect	on	sex	equality	 that	 they	 have	 had	 in	 the	 traditional	 economy.	 	 Regardless	then	 of	 whether	 current	 law	 extends	 to	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 the	sharing	 economy	 should	 raise	 serious	 concern	 for	 proponents	 of	 sex	equality.	 	This	Part	concludes	with	a	few	words	on	new	directions	the	law	might	take	to	address	this	concern.	
I.		INTIMACY	AND	IDENTITY	IN	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	The	sharing	economy	heightens	 the	salience	of	 the	 identity	of	both	sellers	 and	 buyers	 because	 of	 the	 increased	 intimacy	 of	 the	transactions	therein.	 	This	Part	 first	describes	the	 intimacy	of	sharing	economy	transactions,	and	then	explains	how	intimacy	makes	identity	more	salient.	
A.	 Intimacy	The	 sharing	 economy	 tends	 to	 encompass	 more	 intimate	transactions	 than	 the	 traditional	 economy	 for	 two	 reasons.	 	 First,	 the	
place	 of	 the	 transaction	 confers	 intimacy.	 	 Sharing	 economy	transactions	tend	to	merge	home	and	market	in	that	they	occur	in	the	seller’s	or	buyer’s	private	car	or	home.		Second,	sharing	economy	firms	rely	on	 intimacy	as	a	 risk-reducing	mechanism	 that	 confers	 trust.	 	To	overcome	 the	 riskiness	 of	 sharing	 economy	 transactions,	 sharing	economy	firms	rely	not	on	firm	reputation	or	other	guarantees	by	the	firm,	 but	 rather	 by	 making	 transactions	 more	 intimate,	 that	 is,	 by	predicating	 transactions	 on	 personal	 information	 about	 buyers	 and	sellers.		These	mechanisms	are	discussed	in	turn.	
1.	 Place	Transactions	 in	 the	 sharing	economy	are	often	more	 intimate	 than	transactions	 in	 the	 traditional	 economy	 because	 of	 where	 they	 take	place,	outside	of	the	traditional	workplace.		Perhaps	the	most	defining	feature	of	the	sharing	economy	is	that	it	enables	the	disaggregation	of	the	 sale	 of	 one’s	 property	 (e.g.,	 cars,	 homes)	 and	 labor.15	 	 When	 it	comes	to	property,	this	means	that	sellers	are	able	to	sell	segments	of	their	own	personal	property,	such	as	rooms	in	their	homes	or	rides	in	their	 cars,	 for	 short	 segments	 of	 time.	 	When	 it	 comes	 to	 labor,	 this	means	that	sellers	are	able	to	sell	smaller	segments	of	their	labor.		The	sale	 of	 disaggregated	 personal	 property	 often	 entails	 a	 seller	 having	
                                                                                                             
	 15.	 See	Rauch	&	Schleicher,	supra	note	6,	at	5–6.	
8	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	someone	come	into	her	home	(AirBnB)	or	her	car	(Uber).16		The	sale	of	disaggregated	 personal	 labor	 often	 entails	 a	 seller	 providing	 labor	 in	the	buyer’s	home	(TaskRabbit	or	Kitchensurfing).17	The	 rise	 of	 the	 sharing	 economy	 then	 challenges	 the	 traditional	sociological	division	between	 the	 “first	place,”	which	 is	 the	home,	 the	“second	place,”	which	is	the	workplace,	and	the	“third	place,”	which	are	communal	spaces	generally	open	to	the	public	that	may	or	may	not	be	part	 of	 the	market.18	 Some	 sharing	 economy	 transactions	merge	 the	first	 and	 second	 places.	 	 For	 example,	 TaskRabbit,	 which	 allows	consumers	 to	 hire	 “taskers”	 to	 complete	 a	 variety	 of	 tasks	 in	 their	homes,	 renders	 the	 same	 space—the	 consumer’s	 home—the	 second	place	 for	 the	 worker	 and	 the	 first	 place	 for	 the	 consumer.19	 	 Other	sharing	 economy	 transactions	 bring	 more	 merging	 of	 the	 first	 and	third	 places.	 	 For	 example,	 ride-sharing	 services	 render	 the	 same	space—the	seller’s	car—the	first	place	for	workers	(albeit	in	a	private	car	 rather	 than	 a	 private	 home)	 and	 the	 third	 place	 for	 consumers.		Finally,	 some	 sharing	 economy	 transactions	 merge	 the	 first,	 second,	
and	 third	 places.	 	 For	 example,	 AirBnB	 and	 other	 home-sharing	services	 render	 the	 same	 space—the	 seller’s	 home—the	 first	 and	second	places	for	the	owner	(who	is	working	in	her	own	home)	and	the	third	place	for	the	consumer.20	To	 be	 sure,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 these	 places	 are	 always	 neatly	divided	 in	 the	 traditional	 economy.	 	 Much	 service	 work	 in	 the	traditional	 economy	 blurs	 the	 second	 and	 third	 places:	 the	 same	setting,	for	example,	a	hair	salon,	is	a	second	place	for	the	worker	and	a	
                                                                                                             
	 16.	 About	Uber,	UBER,	https://www.uber.com/our-story/	[https://perma.cc/GZ6B-Q8LC];	 About	 Us,	 AIRBNB,	 https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us	[https://perma.cc/2KU4-PKBR].	
	 17.	 See	TASKRABBIT	https://www.taskrabbit.com/	 [https://perma.cc/7ENH-D4B9];	KITCHENSURFING,	https://www.kitchensurfing.com/	[https://perma.cc/A4ZC-KRYW]	(“a	professional	chef	cooks	in	your	kitchen	once	a	week	so	you	can	cross	dinner	off	your	to	do	 list”);	 “Uber”	 Your	 Cooking;	 The	 Sharing	 Economy	 Comes	 to	 Your	 Kitchen,	 FORBES	(May	 13,	 2015),	 http://www.forbes.com/sites/thehartmangroup/2015/05/13/uber-your-cooking-the-sharing-economy-comes-to-your-kitchen/	 [https://perma.cc/XQ49-TMFK].	
	 18.	 See	 generally	 RAY	 OLDENBURG,	 THE	 GREAT	 GOOD	 PLACE:	 CAFES,	 COFFEE	 SHOPS,	COMMUNITY	CENTERS,	BEAUTY	PARLORS,	GENERAL	STORES,	BARS,	HANGOUTS,	AND	HOW	THEY	GET	YOU	THROUGH	THE	DAY	(1999)	(coining	the	term	“third	place,”	and	distinguishing	it	from	the	“first	place”	and	the	“second	place”);	Leo	W.	Jeffres	et	al.,	The	Impact	of	Third	Places	
on	 Community	 Quality	 of	 Life,	 4	 APPLIED	 RESEARCH	 IN	 QUALITY	 OF	 LIFE	 333,	 334	 (2009)	(listing	as	third	places,	inter	alia,	community	centers,	senior	centers,	coffee	shops	and	cafes,	bars	and	pubs,	restaurants,	shopping	centers,	stores,	malls,	markets,	hair	salons,	barber	and	beauty	shops,	recreation	centers,	YM/WCA,	pools,	movie	theaters).	
	 19.	 See	TASKRABBIT,	supra	note	17.	
	 20.	 See	About	Us,	AIRBNB,	supra	note	16.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 9	third	place	 for	 the	 consumer.21	 	And	domestic	 service	work	blurs	 the	first	 and	 second	 places:	 the	 same	 setting—the	 consumer’s	 home—is	the	second	place	for	the	worker	and	the	first	place	for	the	consumer.22		The	point	then	is	not	that	this	blurring	is	entirely	new	or	unique	to	the	sharing	economy,	but	that	the	size	of	the	sharing	economy	calls	these	boundaries	 into	question	more	 than	 ever	before,	 as	more	production	and	 exchange	 occurs	 in	 private	 spaces.23	 	 This	 shift	 in	 the	 place	 of	productivity	to	private	settings	might	be	viewed	as	a	return	to	the	pre-Industrial	 Revolution	 era,	 when	 much	 production	 was	 done	 in	 the	home.24	 	 This	 shift	 has	 significance	 for	 legal	 regulation,	 to	 which	 I	return	in	Part	III.		Here,	my	focus	is	on	explaining	how	this	shift	makes	transactions	in	the	sharing	economy	more	intimate.	Sociologists	have	defined	intimate	interactions	as	those	that	depend	on	 “particularized	 knowledge	 received,	 and	 attention	 provided	 by,	 at	least	 one	 person–knowledge	 and	 attention	 that	 are	 not	 widely	available	 to	 third	 parties.”25	 	 The	 knowledge	 is	 not	 ordinary	knowledge,	 but	 knowledge	 of	 special	 types	 of	 information	 such	 as	“shared	secrets,	interpersonal	rituals,	bodily	information,	awareness	of	personal	 vulnerability,	 and	 shared	 memory	 of	 embarrassing	situations.”26		Nor	is	the	attention	ordinary	attention,	but	attention	that	encompasses	“such	elements	as	terms	of	endearment,	bodily	services,	private	 languages,	emotional	support,	and	correction	of	embarrassing	defects.”27	The	 direct	 interaction	 between	 buyer	 and	 seller	 in	more	 personal	spaces	 makes	 these	 transactions	 intimate,	 giving	 access	 to	 private	information	 that	 is	 not	 typically	 shared	 with	 others.	 	 And	 the	placement	of	these	services	in	personal	spaces	primes	the	interactions	to	 take	 on	 a	more	 intimate	 character	 beyond	 the	 information	 that	 is	revealed	 simply	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 interaction	 takes	 place	there.	 	 Without	 the	 structure	 and	 signals	 of	 a	 third-party	 firm	 in	 an	
                                                                                                             	 21.	 This	lends	unique	dynamics	to	much	of	this	work.		See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	10,	at	1194,	1213.	
	 22.	 See	Roberts,	supra	note	4,	at	60–61.		 23.	 John	 Hawsworth	 &	 Robert	 Vaughan,	 PWC,	 THE	 SHARING	 ECONOMY—SIZING	 THE	REVENUE	 OPPORTUNITY	 (2015),	http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.html	 [https://perma.cc/Q4HB-83VU]	(estimating	 the	potential	 value	 of	 the	 five	main	 sharing	 economy	 sectors	 to	 be	 $335	billion	by	2015).	
	 24.	 See,	e.g.,	Frances	Olsen,	The	Family	and	the	Market:	A	Study	of	Ideology	and	Legal	
Reform,	96	HARV.	L.	REV.	1497,	1499	(1983).		 25.	 VIVIANA	A.	ZELIZER,	THE	PURCHASE	OF	INTIMACY	14-15	(2005).	
	 26.	 Id.	at	15.	
	 27.	 Id.	
10	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	office	setting	mediating	the	transaction,	buyers	and	sellers	tend	to	fall	back	on	 the	 scripts	of	personal	 interaction	 in	unregulated	spaces	 like	the	home.28	Note	 that	not	all	 transactions	 in	 the	sharing	economy	are	 intimate,	and	 of	 those	 that	 are	 intimate,	 some	 are	more	 intimate	 than	 others.		For	example,	one	might	rent	out	an	apartment	that	one	does	not	live	in	through	 AirBnB.	 	 Unless	 the	 apartment	 owner	 chooses	 to	 meet	 the	AirBnB	 renter	 or	 to	 include	 personal	 items	 in	 the	 apartment	 (e.g.,	photographs	or	mementos),	this	transaction	would	not	be	intimate.		An	AirBnB	 owner	 who	 rents	 out	 a	 room	 in	 her	 home	 with	 a	 shared	bathroom	engages	in	a	more	intimate	transaction	than	one	who	rents	out	a	separate	apartment	within	her	home.		Likewise,	Uber	drivers	and	those	who	ride	with	them	can,	to	a	large	extent,	choose	how	intimate	to	make	their	transactions	by	deciding	how	much	information	to	reveal	in	conversation.	 	 Some	 riders	 have	 chosen	 to	 make	 their	 transactions	with	 ride-share	 drivers	 far	 more	 intimate,	 by,	 for	 example,	 sharing	personal	information	and	even	changing	in	the	backseat	of	the	car.29	
2.	 Trust	Transactions	 are	 risky.	 	 Market	 transactions	 present	 risks	 for	sellers—whether	 they	will	 be	 compensated	 for	 the	 goods	 or	 services	they	sell—and	for	buyers—whether	they	will	get	the	goods	or	services	they	 bargained	 for.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 basic	 risks	 of	 transacting,	buyers	and	sellers	may	face	additional	risks,	such	as	the	safety	risk	that	arises	when	the	transaction	is	 face-to-face.	 	Searching	for	appropriate	persons	with	whom	to	transact	and	assessing	the	reliability	of	market	strangers	 involves	 significant	 transaction	 costs.30	 	 Firms	 help	 to	mitigate	these	costs	by	building	trust	based	on	reputation.31	
                                                                                                             	 28.	 Marjorie	L.	De	Vault,	Home	and	Work:	Negotiating	Boundaries	through	Everyday	
Life,	102	AM.	J.	OF	SOCIOLOGY	1491,	1491	(1997)	(book	review).	
	 29.	 See	Winnie	 Hu,	 She	 Rides,	 a	 New	 York	 Taxi	 Service	 Aimed	 at	Women,	 Finds	 a	
Loyal	 Following,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Nov.	 11,	 2014),	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/nyregion/new-york-taxi-service-aimed-at-women-finds-loyal-following.html	[https://perma.cc/QQU4-JVVS].	
	 30.	 See	 Rauch	 &	 Schleicher,	 supra	 note	 6,	 at	 9;	 see	 also	 The	 rise	 of	 the	 sharing	
economy:	 On	 the	 internet,	 everything	 is	 for	 hire,	 THE	 ECONOMIST	 (Mar.	 9,	 2013),	http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy	[https://perma.cc/YGJ6-94RZ].		 31.	 Benjamin	 Edelman	 &	 Michael	 Luca,	 Digital	 Discrimination:	 The	 Case	 of	
Airbnb.com	 3	 (Harvard	 Business	 School,	 Working	 Paper	 14-054,	 2014),	http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/digital-discrimination-the-case-of-airbnb-com	[https://perma.cc/KGY6-8UFC];	 PWC,	 The	 Sharing	 Economy,	 Consumer	 Intelligence	Series	 16,	 https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/VK2V-
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 11	In	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 technology	 has	 reduced	 the	 firm’s	 role	 in	matching	 buyers	 and	 sellers.32	 	 The	 term	 “peer-to-peer”	 economy,	sometimes	used	to	describe	the	sharing	economy,	nicely	captures	this.		The	 sharing	 economy	 lowers	 transactions	 costs	 associated	 with	matching	 consumers	 and	 producers,	 and	 these	 lowered	 transaction	costs	allow	for	the	disaggregated	consumption	of	goods	and	services.33		Although	such	disaggregated	consumption	can	take	place	through	the	use	 of	 mediating	 firms,	 and	 they	 long	 have	 (e.g.,	 hotels,	 car	 rental	companies),	technology	allows	expansion	of	this	model	to	enable	more	and	more	casual	disaggregation	of	consumption.		This	means	that	firms	are	 relied	 on	 less,	 and	 transactions	 are	 based	more	 on	 relationships	between	 the	 consumer	 and	 producer.34	 	 This	 fact	 already	 makes	sharing	economy	transactions	more	personal.	With	these	more	personal	transactions	and	risks,	the	resulting	need	for	 trust	 remains.	 	 Sharing	 economy	 firms	 like	Uber	 and	AirBnB	 that	connect	buyers	and	sellers	mediate	some	risks	both	by	reputation	and	policy,	but	much	less	so	than	in	the	traditional	economy.		This	leads	to	the	 need	 for	 alternative	 sources	 of	 trust	 necessary	 for	 markets	 to	operate.35	One	 of	 the	 primary	 ways	 of	 engendering	 trust	 in	 the	 sharing	economy	is	by	making	transactions	between	producers	and	consumers	more	 personal:	 by	 replacing	 the	 trust	 placed	 in	 the	 firm	 with	 trust	placed	 in	 individual	 sellers	 and	 buyers.36	 	 Sharing	 economy	transactions	are	often	made	to	turn	on	the	individual’s	characteristics.		For	many	services,	either	sellers	or	buyers	or	both	create	profiles	that	reveal	 information	 about	 themselves,	 including	 their	 names	 and	photographs.37		Both	buyers	and	sellers	can	rate	each	other,	and	these	
                                                                                                             56XX]	 (citing	 that	 “69%	 [of	 consumers	 surveyed]	 say	 they	 will	 not	 trust	 sharing	economy	companies	until	they	are	recommended	by	someone	they	trust”).		Of	course,	in	addition	to	the	role	of	reputation,	law	also	places	burdens	on	firms	(and	individuals)	that	 reduce	 risks	 to	 sellers	and	buyers.	 	 I	 return	 to	a	discussion	of	 the	 role	of	 law	 in	Part	III.	
	 32.	 Id.	
	 33.	 See	Rauch	&	Schleicher,	supra	note	6,	at	9.	
	 34.	 See	Rogers,	supra	note	7,	at	97	(discussing	how	Uber	drivers	need	to	establish	“micro-relationships”	to	earn	certain	ratings).		 35.	 Rachel	 Botsman,	 The	 Currency	 of	 the	 New	 Economy	 is	 Trust,	 TED	 Talk	 (June	2012),	http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_trust?language=en	(“The	currency	of	the	new	economy	is	trust.”).	
	 36.	 See	Rauch	&	Schleicher,	supra	note	6,	at	9.	
	 37.	 See	 Airbnb	 Help,	Why	 do	 I	 need	 to	 have	 an	 Airbnb	 profile	 or	 profile	 photo?,	AIRBNB,	 https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/67/why-do-i-need-to-have-an-airbnb-profile-or-profile-photo	[https://perma.cc/4MRG-7PZX];	see	 Jamiev2014,	“Putting	the	“Pro”	 in	 Profile,	 TASKRABBIT	 BLOG	 (Apr.	 10,	 2013),	
12	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	ratings	 feature	 prominently	 in	 online	 profiles.38	 	 This	 intensifies	 the	shift	 of	 focus	 of	 the	 transaction	 from	 one	 with	 the	 sharing	 economy	firm	to	one	between	the	individual	buyer	and	seller.39	With	this	focus	on	the	transaction	between	the	buyer	and	the	seller	often	comes	a	sense	of	social	or	personal	connection	between	the	two	that	 sharing	economy	 firms	emphasize.40	 	 Indeed,	 some	 firms	market	themselves	 specifically	 on	 a	 model	 of	 intimacy.	 	 Lyft,	 a	 ride-sharing	competitor	 to	 Uber,	 has	 used	 the	 tagline:	 “your	 friend	 with	 a	 car.”41		Tripda,	 a	 long-distance	 ride-sharing	 platform	 has	 emphasized	 the	social	 nature	 of	 the	 service:	 “Why	 travel	 alone?	 Carpool	 instead!	Sharing	a	ride	is	fun	&	social.	We	connect	you	with	new	and	interesting	people	 to	 share	 a	 ride	 with,	 while	 saving	 on	 your	 travel	 costs!”42		AirBnB	 has	 also	 marketed	 itself	 as	 a	 great	 way	 to	 meet	 people,	including	romantic	partners.43	
                                                                                                             https://blog.taskrabbit.com/2013/04/10/putting-the-pro-in-profile/	[https://perma.cc/68QP-Z2XG].	
	 38.	 See	 Rauch	 &	 Schleicher,	 supra	 note	 6,	 at	 9;	 see	 Uber	 Help,	 How	 are	 Ratings	
Calculated,	 UBER,	 https://help.uber.com/h/66ce3340-aa1f-4357-b955-027ef50441d3	[https://perma.cc/6RQF-7BT6].		 39.	 See	 In	 the	Battle	Between	Lyft	And	Uber,	The	Focus	 Is	On	Drivers,	NPR	ALL	TECH	CONSIDERED	 (Jan.	 18,	 2016),	http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/01/18/463473462/is-uber-good-to-drivers-it-s-relative	 [https://perma.cc/8WML-6MXQ].	 	And	as	 the	 founder	of	RelayRides,	a	car-sharing	market-place	noted,	“You	meet	great,	interesting	people.		You	have	great	stories.”		See	Singer,	supra	note	1.		 40.	 One	article	raised	concerns	about	 the	sharing	economy	for	 those	with	autism,	who	 tend	 to	 want	 to	 avoid	 intimacy.	 	 See	 Lynne	 Soraya,	 Disability	 and	 the	 Sharing	
Economy,	 PSYCHOLOGY	 TODAY	 (Aug.	 11,	 2014),	https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/aspergers-diary/201408/disability-and-the-sharing-economy	 [https://perma.cc/9A7S-3BPH].	 	 For	 those	 with	 anti-intimacy	preferences,	the	personalization	of	transactions	in	the	sharing	economy	raises	anxiety	about	the	expectations	for	intimate	interaction	in	such	transactions.		It	is	acceptable	to	sit	 silently	 in	 a	 taxi,	 but	 perhaps	 not	 when	 one	 uses	 Uber	 or	 Lyft.	 	 Given	 the	expectations	 of	 intimacy,	 a	 passenger’s	 ratings	may	 be	 affected	 by	 his	 anti-intimacy	preference	if	she	chooses	not	to	engage	with	her	driver.		The	same	concerns	on	the	flip	side	could	be	raised	for	drivers	with	autism.		 41.	 Jason	 Tanz,	How	 AirBnB	 and	 Lyft	 Finally	 Got	 Americans	 to	 Trust	 Each	 Other,	WIRED	(Apr.	23,	2014),	http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/	[https://perma.cc/V8WV-279N].	
	 42.	 How	 It	 Works,	 SHARING	 TRIP,	 http://sharingtrip.in/how-it-work.html#	[https://perma.cc/C8GH-K5EH].	 	Tripda	ceased	operations	in	February	2016.	 	TRIPDA,	https://tripda.com/	[https://perma.cc/47J4-QXF6].	
	 43.	 Host,	 AIRBNB,	 https://www.airbnb.com/host	 [https://perma.cc/5B2V-5XB8]	(“Besides	 the	 extra	 income,	 hosts	 join	 a	 supportive	 worldwide	 community”);	When	
Strangers	 Meet:	 An	 Airbnb	 Love	 Story,	 AIRBNB	 BLOG	 (Feb.	 13,	 2015),	http://blog.airbnb.com/strangers-to-soul-mates-couples-who-met-through-airbnb/	[https://perma.cc/Z7PU-99MB?type=image	]	(“This	is	part	of	our	special	series	‘When	Strangers	 Meet’.	 Have	 you	 met	 someone	 special	 through	 a	 chance	 encounter	 on	Airbnb?	 Friend,	 husband,	 wife,	 long	 lost	 soul	 mate:	 we	 want	 to	 hear	 your	 story.	 	 It	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 13	The	 intended	 level	 of	 intimacy	 of	 the	 transaction	may	 vary	 by	 the	sharing	 economy	 firm	 offering	 the	 service.	 	 A	 driver	 who	 worked	through	both	Uber	and	Lyft	emphasizes	the	more	personal	relationship	that	Lyft	tries	to	cultivate	between	its	drivers	and	riders	as	compared	with	Uber:	[Uber]	recommends	that	drivers	“wear	a	collared	shirt	and	generally	look	professional.”	They	also	advise	that	drivers	should	open	the	door	and	put	bags	in	the	trunk.				 Lyft,	 conversely,	 encourages	 uniqueness.	 Drivers	 are	 musicians,	artists,	and	entrepreneurs	like	myself	(among	many	other	paths),	and	their	 personalities	 come	 through	 via	 their	 clothing	 and	 their	 cars.	Drivers	 create	 goofy	 concepts,	 such	 as	 the	 Disco	 Lyft,	 the	 Karaoke	Lyft,	and	 the	Chalkboard	Lyft.	Cars	are	still	 clean	and	safe,	but	 rides	are	 treated	as	an	opportunity	 for	an	experience	.	.	.	.	 Lyft	encourages	you	 to	be	 a	 good	 friend.	Provide	a	 clean	 car,	 have	 fun,	 and	don’t	 let	your	pal	down.	The	culture	is	goofy,	 fun,	unique,	and	irreverent,	 just	like	a	true	bud.	You’re	encouraged	to	be	yourself	and	have	fun.		Uber	wants	you	to	be	a	chauffeur	and	to	treat	the	role	as	a	career.	It’s	run	with	 military	 precision	 and	 professionalism	 is	 encouraged	 from	drivers.44	
B.	 Identity	As	a	general	matter,	whether	in	the	traditional	or	sharing	economy,	intimacy	 tends	 to	 breed	 discrimination.	 	 Intimacy	 enhances	 the	salience	 of	 the	 particular	worker	 and	her	 identity	 to	 the	 consumer.45		Intimate	 workers’	 identities	 can	 be	 powerful	 signals.	 	 The	 intimate	worker	 is	 in	 many	 ways	 inseparable	 from	 her	 product:	 the	 intimate	
                                                                                                             happens	when	you	let	your	guard	down.	When	you	open	up	to	new	adventures.	Or,	as	everyone	 and	 their	 mother	 says:	 Finding	 “the	 one”	 happens	 when	 you’re	 not	 even	looking	 for	 it.	 	 So	 maybe	 we	 shouldn’t	 be	 surprised	 to	 discover	 an	 overwhelming	number	of	couples	who	met	and	fell	in	love	through	the	serendipitous	circumstance	of	an	Airbnb.	But	we	still	are.	Every	time.	From	strangers	to	soul	mates,	we’re	celebrating	Valentine’s	 Day	 with	 the	 stories	 of	 couples	 who	met	 through	 one	 fateful	 stay	 in	 an	Airbnb.	 This	 is	 one	 of	 them.”);	 Anh-Minh	 Le,	 “When	 Strangers	 Meet”	 Film	 Contest	
Winners,	 AIRBNB	 BLOG	 (Jan	 27,	 2015),	 http://blog.airbnb.com/when-strangers-meet-film-contest-winners/	 [https://perma.cc/VJ6A-F9JY]	 (sponsoring	 film	 contest	 about	strangers	meeting	on	AirBnB).		 44.	 Greg	 Muender,	 Uber	 vs.	 Lyft:	 A	 former	 driver	 compares	 the	 two	 services,	PANDO.COM	 (Dec.	 3,	 2014),	 https://pando.com/2014/12/03/uber-vs-lyft-a-former-driver-compares-the-two-services/	[https://perma.cc/7BHE-L4WE].	
	 45.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Harry	 J.	 Holzer	 &	 Keith	 R.	 Ihlanfeldt,	 Customer	 Discrimination	 and	
Employment	Outcomes	for	Minority	Workers,	113	Q.J.	ECON.	835	(1998)	(finding	that	the	racial	 composition	of	 an	establishment’s	 customers	has	 sizable	 effects	on	 the	 race	of	who	 gets	 hired	 in	 jobs	 that	 involve	 direct	 contact	 with	 customer	 and	 hypothesizing	that	this	is	due	to	customer	preferences	in	relationships).	
14	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	services	 she	 provides.46	 	 Thus,	 the	 worker’s	 identity	 characteristics	“serve	 as	 signifiers	.	.	.	that	 shape	 expectations	 about	 the	 service	 they	are	 to	 receive.”47	 	 For	 example,	 the	 Filipina	 childcare	 worker,	 for	instance,	 is	 seen	as	caring,	 family-first,	 and	docile.48	 	While	 the	signal	may	not	be	reliable,	 it	provides	an	easy	shortcut	when	 information	 is	expensive	and	biases	run	deep.49	Consumers	may	 then	 perceive	 identity	 to	 be	 quite	 relevant	 to	 the	provision	 of	 intimate	 services.	 	 Identity	 may	 be	 seen	 to	 confer	expertise:	 a	 woman	may	 believe	 that	 a	 female	 gynecologist	 is	 better	able	 to	 understand	 her	 problems.50	 	 Identity	 preferences	 may	 also	derive	 from	 a	 belief	 that	 the	 consumer	 will	 face	 less	 discrimination	from	 workers	 who	 share	 the	 consumer’s	 identity.51	 	 For	 example,	 a	woman	might	believe	 that	 a	 female	divorce	 lawyer	would	hold	 fewer	biases	against	her	choices	 in	seeking	alimony	and	child	support.	 	The	sensitive	circumstances	of	intimate	services	can	also	lead	consumers	to	be	more	comfortable	with	workers	of	a	particular	 identity.52	Intimacy	
                                                                                                             
	 46.	 See	Robin	Leidner,	Emotional	Labor	in	Service	Work,	561	ANNALS	AM.	ACAD.	POL.	&	SOC.	SCI.	81,	83	(1999);	Amy	S.	Wharton,	The	Sociology	of	Emotional	Labor,	35	ANN.	REV.	SOC.	147,	152	(2009).		 47.	 Wharton,	supra	note	46,	at	152	(internal	quotation	marks	omitted).	
	 48.	 See	 Cameron	 Lynne	 Macdonald	 &	 David	 Merrill,	 Intersectionality	 in	 the	
Emotional	 Proletariat,	 SERVICE	 WORK:	 CRITICAL	 PERSPECTIVES	 113,	 121-22	 (Marek	Korczynski	 &	 Cameron	 Lynne	Macdonald	 eds.,	 2009)	 (explaining	 that	 “racial/ethnic	groups	 are	 preferred	 by	 parents	 [for	 caregivers]	 based	 on	 their	 presumed	 qualities	that	 are	 rooted	 in	 their	 ethnicity,”	 and	quoting	 a	 childcare	placement	 agency	owner:	“people	 think	 that	Filipinas	are	 from	a	different	planet	where	everybody	cares	about	children”).		 49.	 For	the	seminal	discussion	on	labor	market	signals,	see	Michael	A.	Spence,	Job	
Market	Signaling,	87	Q.J.	ECON.	355,	356-61	(1973),	and	for	more	general	discussion	on	signals,	 see	 George	 Akerlof,	 The	 Market	 for	 “Lemons”:	 Quality	 Uncertainty	 and	 the	
Market	Mechanism,	84	Q.	J.	ECON.	488,	489	(1970).	
	 50.	 See	Tamar	Lewin,	Women’s	Health	Is	No	Longer	a	Man’s	World,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Feb.	7,	 2001),	 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/us/women-s-health-is-no-longer-a-man-s-world.html	 [https://perma.cc/Y9T4-8H3C]	 (discussing	 how	 women’s	preference	 for	 female	 gynecologist	 is	 partially	 rooted	 in	 the	 belief	 that	 they	 will	understand	women’s	health	better	because	they	are	women).		 51.	 This	 is	 at	 least	 part	 of	 the	 basis	 for	 same-race	 preferences	 in	 health	 care	providers.	See	 Jennifer	Malat	&	Mary	Ann	Hamilton,	Preference	 for	Same-Race	Health	
Care	 Providers	 and	 Perceptions	 of	 Interpersonal	 Discrimination	 in	 Health	 Care,	 47	 J.	HEALTH	 &	 SOC.	 BEHAV.	 173	 (2006);	 Frederick	 M.	 Chen	 et	 al.,	 Patients’	 Beliefs	 About	
Racism,	Preferences	 for	Physician	Race,	and	Satisfaction	With	Care,	3	ANNALS	FAM.	MED.	138	 (2005)	 (analyzing	 surveys	 showing	 that	 minorities	 who	 perceive	 racism	 in	 the	healthcare	system	are	more	likely	to	prefer	physicians	of	the	same	race).	
	 52.	 See,	 e.g.,	Lewin,	 supra	note	50	 (in	 context	 of	 gynecologists,	 noting	 that	 “many	women	 find	 it	 easier	 to	 talk	 to	 another	 woman	 when	 the	 subject	 is	 sexuality	 or	menopause	or	pregnancy”).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 15	also	strengthens	the	motivation	to	discriminate	in	the	other	direction–from	sellers	against	buyers.53	In	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 the	 shift	 in	 focus	 from	 an	 impersonal	transaction	with	a	 firm	 to	a	personal	 interaction	between	 individuals	makes	 the	 identity	 of	 both	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	 seller	 more	 salient.54		Photographs	 and	 even	 names	 can	 reveal	 identity	 traits	 like	 race	 and	sex.55	 	 This	 personalization	 of	 the	 transaction	 not	 only	 enables	discrimination,56	but	by	 focusing	 the	basis	of	 trust	 in	 the	relationship	between	seller	and	buyer,	it	heightens	the	salience	of	the	identity	of	the	transacting	parties,	heightening	the	odds	of	discrimination.57		Indeed,	it	is	precisely	“‘[t]he	social	nature	of	 the	sharing	economy	[that	renders	
                                                                                                             	 53.	 In	 the	 traditional	economy,	 the	 issue	of	discrimination	against	consumers	has	focused	 on	 discrimination	 that	 arises	 out	 of	 religious	 and	 moral	 preferences	 of	workers,	 e.g.,	 a	 wedding	 vendor	 who	 refuses	 service	 to	 gay	 couples.	 	 See,	 e.g.,	Washington	 v.	 Arlene’s	 Flowers,	 No.	 13-2-00871-5,	https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015-02-18—ord._denying_defs._msj_and_granting_pls._and_wa_states_msj.pdf	[https://perma.cc/LU8J-4LJA	 ]	 (upholding	 discrimination	 challenge	 to	 wedding	florist’s	 refusal	 to	 serve	 gay	 couple	 against	 First	 Amendment	 defenses);	 Elane	Photography,	 LLC	 v.	 Willock,	 309	 P.3d	 53	 (N.M.	 2013)	 (upholding	 discrimination	challenge	 to	 wedding	 photographer’s	 refusal	 to	 serve	 gay	 couple	 against	 First	Amendment	defenses);	Michael	Paulson	&	Fernanda	Santos,	Religious	Right	in	Arizona	
Cheers	 Bill	 Allowing	 Businesses	 to	 Refuse	 to	 Serve	 Gays,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Feb.	 21,	 2014),	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/religious-right-in-arizona-cheers-bill-allowing-businesses-to-refuse-to-serve-gays.html	[https://perma.cc/62TZ-HW5S].	
	 54.	 See	Stacy	Perman,	Is	Uber	Dangerous	for	Women?,	MARIE	CLAIRE	(May	20,	2015),	http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a14480/uber-rides-dangerous-for-women	 [https://perma.cc/64BD-WDSG	 ]	 (quoting	 David	 Plouffe,	 former	 Obama	campaign	manager	 now	 serving	 as	 Uber’s	 senior	 vice	 president	 of	 public	 policy	 and	strategy:	 “[T]he	 relationship	 that	 is	 most	 important	 to	 an	 Uber	 rider	 is	 that	relationship	with	their	Uber	driver,	and	it’s	one	that	they	really	cherish.”).	
	 55.	 See	 Marianne	 Bertrand	 &	 Sendhil	 Mullainathan,	 Are	 Emily	 and	 Greg	 More	
Employable	 than	 Lakisha	 and	 Jamal?	 A	 Field	 Experiment	 on	 Labor	 Market	
Discrimination,	94	AM.	ECON.	REV.	991,	991–92	(2004).		 56.	 Edelman	 &	 Luca,	 supra	 note	 31,	 at	 9-11(documenting	 race	 discrimination	against	sellers	on	AirBnB);	Ian	Ayres,	Mahzarin	R.	Banaji,	&	Christine	Jolls,	Race	Effects	
on	Ebay,	46	RAND	J.	ECON.	891	(2015)	(documenting	race	discrimination	against	sellers	of	 baseball	 cards	 on	 Ebay	 by	 varying	 race	 of	 person	 holding	 the	 card).	 	 The	 ratings	system	may	be	one	mechanism	by	which	discriminatory	bias	is	manifested.	 	See	Greg	Harman,	The	sharing	economy	is	not	as	open	as	you	might	think,	THEGUARDIAN	(Nov.	12,	2014),	http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/nov/12/algorithms-race-discrimination-uber-lyft-airbnb-peer	 [https://perma.cc/HX2P-YHT2];	 Rogers,	
supra	note	7,	at	95.	
	 57.	 The	New	Sidecar	Has	Arrived,	SIDECAR	(Feb.	19,	2014),	https://www.side.cr/the-new-sidecar-has-arrived/	 [https://perma.cc/YJ92-6S4Q]	 (“You	 can	 now	 differentiate	yourself	by	the	picture	of	your	car,	your	profile	photo,	or	your	amazing	attitude	and	the	service	you	provide.	Sidecar’s	new	“bumper	sticker”	gives	you	the	ability	to	advertise	what’s	great	about	your	ride	and	increases	your	chance	of	getting	chosen	by	riders.”)	
16	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	it]	 more	 vulnerable	 [to	 identity	 preferences]	 than	 the	 traditional	economy.’”58	Other	 circumstances	 related	 to	 the	 intimacy	 of	 sharing	 economy	transactions	 make	 identity	 preferences	 particularly	 likely	 to	 flourish	there.	 	The	privacy	of	sharing	economy	transactions	means	that	these	transactions	 take	 place	 in	 contexts	 that	 lack	 structural	 features	 that	constrain	discrimination.		In	the	traditional	economy,	transactions	are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 entered	 into	 in	 public	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 others,	rather	than	in	front	of	a	computer	in	the	privacy	of	one’s	own	home,	or	on	one’s	smartphone.59		The	publicness	of	interacting	in	the	traditional	economy	means	that	buyers	and	sellers	are	more	likely	to	be	subject	to	the	 pressures	 of	 social	 norms,	 including	 the	 norm	 of	nondiscrimination.60			Transacting	online	in	the	sharing	economy,	with	no	one	watching,	makes	it	easier	to	act	on	discriminatory	preferences,	without	any	sense	of	the	constraint	of	being	monitored.	Moreover,	 in	 the	 traditional	 economy,	 institutional	antidiscrimination	 structures	 may	 bring	 benefits	 that	 trickle	 down	even	 to	 those	who	 are	 not	 protected	 by	 antidiscrimination	 law.	 	 For	example,	 equal	 opportunity	 and	 sexual	 harassment	 trainings	 for	employees	 in	 a	 traditional	 firm	 may	 mean	 that	 supervisors	 and	coworkers	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 discriminate	 not	 only	 against	 employees	who	are	protected	by	antidiscrimination,	but	also	against	independent	contractors	 who	 work	 in	 the	 same	 place.61	 	 In	 the	 workplace-less	sharing	economy,	such	institutional	structures	are	largely	absent.	
II.		THE	SALIENCE	OF	SEX	IN	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	The	 last	 Part	 explained	 how	 the	 more	 intimate	 nature	 of	 sharing	economy	 transactions	 heightens	 the	 salience	 of	 identity	 in	 these	transactions.		This	Part	focuses	specifically	on	one	feature	of	identity–sex–and	 discusses	 how	 the	 sex	 of	 both	 buyer	 and	 seller	 plays	 a	substantial	role	in	the	sharing	economy.		This	Part	first	describes	how	
                                                                                                             	 58.	 Jenna	 Wortham,	 Ubering	 While	 Black,	 MEDIUM	 (Oct.	 23,	 2014),	https://medium.com/matter/ubering-while-black-146db581b9db	[https://perma.cc/64WE-4TEX]	(quoting	Michael	Luca).	
	 59.	 See	Rogers,	supra	note	7,	at	95.	
	 60.	 See	Lior	Jacob	Strahilevitz,	‘How’s	My	Driving?’	for	Everyone	(and	Everything),	81	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	1699,	1759-65	(2006)	(discussing	monitoring	and	norm	compliance).	
	 61.	 See	 Cynthia	 Estlund,	 Rebuilding	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 Workplace	 in	 an	 Era	 of	 Self-
Regulation,	 105	 COLUM.	 L.	 REV.	 319	 (2005)	 (discussing	 the	 role	 that	 firms	 play	 in	enforcing	 employment	 discrimination	 law);	 Susan	 Sturm,	 Second	 Generation	
Employment	 Discrimination:	 A	 Structural	 Approach,	 101	 COLUM.	 L.	 REV.	 458	 (2001)	(same);	 cf.	 Vicki	 Schultz,	 The	 Sanitized	 Workplace,	 112	 YALE	 L.J.	 2061	 (2003)	(documenting	firms’	rigorous	enforcement	of	sexual	harassment	law).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 17	in	 these	 intimate	 settings,	 sex	 preferences	 flourish	 due	 to	 interests	related	 to	 privacy,	 comfort,	 enjoyment,	 sexuality,	 and	 security,	which	are	discussed	in	turn.		This	Part	then	discusses	the	way	that	these	sex	preferences	 manifest	 in	 the	 sharing	 economy	 in	 the	 forms	 of	discrimination	and	segregation.	
A.	 Explanations	
1.	 Privacy	As	for	privacy	interests,	these	relate	to	concerns	of	bodily	intimacy,	whether	through	physical	touching,	visual	display,	or	simply	sensitive	information	 about	 the	 body.	 	 One	 common	 preference	 among	 female	customers	 is	 for	 female	 gynecologists.62	 	 We	 can	 see	 a	 similar	preference	 being	 met	 by	 the	 market,	 which	 has	 produced	 all-female	gyms63	 and	 weight-loss	 centers.64	 	 Firms	 routinely	 ask	 customers	whether	they	have	a	sex	preference	for	services	ranging	from	massage	therapy65	to	hair	styling.66	A	 number	 of	 sharing-economy	 transactions	 raise	 these	 privacy	concerns.	 	 If	 an	 AirBnB	 guest	 is	 sharing	 a	 dwelling	 and	 especially	 a	bathroom	with	 her	 host,	 privacy	 concerns	might	 arise	 for	 both	 guest	and	 host.	 	 As	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit	 discussed	 in	 a	 case	 holding	 that	 the	roommate	 relationship	 was	 protected	 by	 the	 right	 to	 intimate	association,	“[a]side	from	immediate	family	or	a	romantic	partner,	 it’s	
                                                                                                             
	 62.	 See	 Lewin,	 supra	 note	 50	 (documenting	 that	 women	 now	 comprise	 over	seventy	 percent	 of	 ob-gyn	 residents	 and	 attributing	 this	 to	 patient	 demand).	 	 In	 the	past	fifteen	years,	the	rising	demand	for	female	gynecologists	and	obstetricians	has	led	to	a	rise	in	all-female	practices.	See	Kate	Stone	Lombardi,	A	Clinic	Where	All	the	Doctors	
Are	 Women,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Dec.	 3,	 2000),	http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/03/nyregion/in-business-a-clinic-where-all-the-doctors-are-women.html	 [https://perma.cc/FG8M-PPJ6];	 WOMEN	 OB/GYN,	http://www.womenobgyn.com	 [https://perma.cc/T234-ZLA6]	 (giving	 the	 tagline	“Women,	 helping	women”	 and	describing	 “group	of	 five	 female	OB/GYN’s,	 and	 three	nurse	practitioners,”	with	a	photograph	of	only	women	providers).		 63.	 EEOC	v.	Sedita,	816	F.	Supp.	1291	(N.D.	Ill.	1993)	(denying	BFOQ	for	health	club	instructors).		 64.	 EEOC	 v.	 HI	 40	 Corp.,	 953	 F.	 Supp.	 301	 (W.D.	 Mo.	 1996)	 (denying	 BFOQ	 for	weight-loss	center	counselors).	
	 65.	 See	 Erika	 Allen,	 The	 First	 Issue	 in	 Any	 Massage,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Sept.	 16,	 2012),	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/fashion/massages-first-issue-man-or-woman-therapist.html	 [https://perma.cc/T234-ZLA6]	 (explaining	 that	 when	 a	 customer	 is	booking	 a	 massage,	 a	 spa’s	 first	 question	 is	 often,	 “Do	 you	 prefer	 a	 male	 or	 female	massage	therapist?”).	
	 66.	 See	 Select	 Service(s)	 And	 Employee(s),	 Bubbles	 Hair	 Salon,	 BUBBLES,	https://bubbles.mylocalsalon.com/onlinebooking/v7410/Steps/SelectServices.aspx	[https://perma.cc/YX6W-BLRW].	
18	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	hard	 to	 imagine	 a	 relationship	 more	 intimate	 than	 that	 between	roommates,	 who	 share	 living	 rooms,	 dining	 rooms,	 kitchens,	bathrooms,	 even	 bedrooms.”67	 	 As	 the	 court	 explained:	 “The	 home	 is	the	 center	 of	 our	 private	 lives.	 Roommates	 note	 our	 comings	 and	goings,	observe	whom	we	bring	back	at	night,	hear	what	songs	we	sing	in	 the	 shower,	 see	us	 in	various	 stages	of	undress	and	 learn	 intimate	details	most	of	us	prefer	to	keep	private.	Roommates	also	have	access	to	 our	 physical	 belongings	 and	 to	 our	 person	.	.	.	.	 Taking	 on	 a	roommate	 means	 giving	 him	 full	 access	 to	 the	 space	 where	 we	 are	most	 vulnerable	.	.	.	.”68	 	 The	 court	 specifically	 recognized	 how	 the	intimacy	 of	 a	 shared	 dwelling	 can	 generate	 sex	 preferences:	 “women	will	often	look	for	female	roommates	because	of	modesty	.	.	.	concerns.	As	 roommates	 often	 share	 bathrooms	 and	 common	 areas,	 a	 girl	may	not	want	to	walk	around	in	her	towel	in	front	of	a	boy.”69	While	 home-sharing	 as	 offered	 by	 sharing-economy	 firms	 like	AirBnB	 is	 typically	 not	 as	 intimate	 as	 the	 roommate	 relationship	because	it	is	short-term,	it	still	raises	many	of	the	same	concerns	even	in	 the	 limited	 time	period	during	which	 the	dwelling	 is	 shared.	 	 Such	persons	may	have		“unfettered	access	to	the	home,”	which	“implicates	significant	 privacy	.	.	.	considerations.”70	 	 And	 such	 bodily	 privacy	concerns	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 home-sharing	 services	 in	 the	 sharing	economy.	 	 One	 female	 ride-sharing	 passenger	 shared	 a	 story	 of	changing	her	 clothes	 in	 the	backseat	of	her	 ride-share	 car,	 and	noted	that	 she	 only	 felt	 comfortable	 doing	 so	 because	 the	 driver	 was	 a	woman.71	
2.	 Comfort/Pleasure	Beyond	preferences	based	in	bodily	intimacy,	sex	preferences	often	arise	 out	 of	 increased	 comfort	 with	 those	 of	 the	 same	 sex	 in	emotionally	 intimate	 settings.	 	 For	 example,	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	most	women	prefer	female	psychotherapists,72	and	firms	that	provide	
                                                                                                             	 67.	 Fair	Housing	Council	of	San	Fernando	Valley	v.	Roommate.com,	LLC,	666	F.3d	1216,	1221	(9th	Cir.	2012).	
	 68.	 Id.	
	 69.	 Id.	
	 70.	 Id.	 	This	short-term,	iterative	nature	of	home-sharing	guests	also	distinguishes	them	from	roommates	in	that	hosts	will	likely	have	many	home-sharing	guests,	but	few	roommates.	
	 71.	 See	Hu,	supra	note	29.	
	 72.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Cynthia	 F.	 Pikus	 &	 Christopher	 L.	 Heavey,	 Client	 Preferences	 for	
Therapist	Gender,	10	J.	COLL.	STUD.	PSYCH.	35	(1996)	(finding	that	women	prefer	women	therapists	 and	 that	 men	 express	 little	 preference);	 Bernadette	 M.	 Lauber	 &	 Jean	Drevenstedt,	 Older	 Adults’	 Preferences	 For	 Age	 and	 Sex	 of	 a	 Therapist,	 14	 CLIN.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 19	services	 addressing	 emotionally	 intimate	 services—from	 divorce	lawyers73	 to	 nannies74—advertise	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex.	 	 These	 sex	preferences	 in	 emotionally	 intimate	 contexts	 are	 not	 simply	 about	comfort,	but	about	pleasure	for	those	who	prefer	their	transactions	to	be	 more	 rather	 than	 less	 intimate	 in	 terms	 of	 sharing	 and	 personal	conversation.		For	those	who	have	such	preferences,	transacting	with	a	person	of	the	same	sex	can	be	seen	to	facilitate	this	 intimacy.	Women	often	 find	 it	 easier	 to	 discuss	 personal	 matters	 with	 other	 women,	particularly	in	the	provision	and	consumption	of	intimate	services.75	A	driver	 for	a	 taxi	 service	aimed	at	women	said	 that	 she	preferred	driving	women	because	 “[m]en	would	 tell	 her	 to	 drive	 faster,	 or	 talk	about	sports,”	whereas	“[w]omen	opened	up	about	their	 lives.”76	 	She	explained:	 “I	 bet	 you,	 if	 it	 had	 been	 a	 man,	 they	 would	 have	 stayed	quiet.”77	 	We	see	these	preferences	exercised	in	the	sharing	economy,	too.	 Several	 ride-sharing	 firms	 advertise	 the	 ability	 to	 select	 women	drivers	 or	 an	 all-female	 driving	 experience	 as	 a	 way	 to	 enhance	 the	comfort	and	enjoyment	of	the	trip.78	
                                                                                                             GERONTOLOGIST	 13	 (1994)	 (finding	 sex	 preferences	 for	 therapists).	 	 These	 sex	preferences	 based	 on	 emotional	 intimacy	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 case	 law.	 	 Healey	 v.	Southwood	Psychiatric	Hosp.,	78	F.3d	128,	133	(3d	Cir.	1996)	(accepting	BFOQ	in	part	based	 in	 theory	 that	 female	 counselors	 could	 better	 serve	 girls	 with	 emotional	troubles).		 73.	 THE	 WOMEN’S	 LAW	 GROUP,	 http://thewomenslawgroup.com	[https://perma.cc/KSR7-ZDQ3]	 (describing	 a	 practice	 of	 “female	 attorneys	who	.	.	.	practice	 law	 from	 a	 woman’s	 perspective,”	 and	 who	 “understand	 that	 going	through	 a	 divorce,	 custody	 issue,	 or	 other	 family	 law	matter	 can	be	 one	 of	 the	most	difficult	 times	 of	 your	 life”);	 WOMEN’S	 DIVORCE	 RIGHTS,	http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/about.php	 [https://perma.cc/2C9B-3QTA]	(“[f]ounded	.	.	.	to	support,	inspire,	and	encourage	women	.	.	.	during	each	stage	of	their	lives”).	
	 74.	 See,	 e.g.,	 RENT	 A	 MOM	 INC.,	 http://www.rentamominc.com	[https://perma.cc/BDV7-3AYF]	 (“The	 Company	 with	 a	 Heart	 for	 Families”);	 RENT	 A	GRANDMA,	http://rentagrandma.com	[https://perma.cc/8HSD-VDJK].	
	 75.	 See	 Pikus	 &	 Heavey,	 supra	 note	 72,	 at	 35	 (women	 prefer	 female	 therapists);	Lauber	&	Drevenstedt,	supra	note	72;	Debra	L.	Roter	et	al.,	Physician	Gender	Effects	in	
Medical	 Communication:	 A	 Meta-analytic	 Review,	 288	 PATIENT-PHYSICIAN	 RELATIONSHIP	756,	759	(2002)	(both	men	and	women	prefer	female	primary	care	physicians	due	to	communication	styles);	see	Klea	D.	Bertakis	et	al.,	Patient-Centered	Communication	 in	
Primary	 Care:	 Physician	 and	 Patient	 Gender	 and	 Gender	 Concordance,	 18	 J.	 WOMEN’S	HEALTH	4,	542-43	(2009)	(intersection	of	female	doctor	with	female	patient	results	in	more	 interactive	 conversations	 focused	on	patient’s	 illness,	 experience,	 and	personal	factors);	 Debra	 Roter	 et	 al.,	 Effects	 of	 Obstetrician	 Gender	 on	 Communication	 and	
Patient	Satisfaction,	 	93	OBSTETRICS	&	GYNECOLOGY	5,	5-6	(1999)	(women	have	a	strong	preference	for	female	doctors	in	obstetrics	and	gynecology).	
	 76.	 See	Hu	supra	note	29.	
	 77.	 Id.		 78.	 Hiawatha	Bray,	Hitchhiking	goes	digital	with	Tripda	ride	sharing	service,	BOSTON	GLOBE	 (Nov.	 21,	 2014),	
20	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	Comfort	 may	 also	 generate	 sex-based	 preferences	 that	 are	consistent	with	stereotypical	male	and	female	roles.		The	placement	of	many	of	these	services	in	the	home	triggers	the	traditional	family	roles	of	men	and	women	even	more	strongly	than	when	workers	act	 in	the	market.	 	 So	 when	 selecting	 “taskers”	 for	 assistance	 with	 household	chores	 through	 a	 sharing	 economy	 firm	 like	 TaskRabbit,	 consumers	may	 feel	 more	 comfortable	 with	 those	 that	 fill	 stereotypical	 gender	roles:	 female	 taskers	 for	 cleaning	 and	 caring	 for	 children,	 and	 male	taskers	for	home	repairs	or	to	help	us	move	furniture.79	
3.	 Sex	Sex	is	a	motivation	for	gender	preferences	in	intimate	spaces.		When	women	want	to	keep	sexuality	out	of	an	intimate	space,	they	may	seek	to	 do	 so	 by	 preserving	 an	 all-female	 space.80	 	 Heteronormative	assumptions	of	course	underlie	 this	strategy:	 that	concerns	about	sex	and	 sexual	 arousal	 raised	 by	 intimacy	 can	 be	 quelled	 by	 providing	these	services	 in	a	 same-sex	space.81	 	Civil	 and	criminal	 law	once	did	
                                                                                                             https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/21/hitchhiking-goes-digital-with-tripda-ride-sharing-service/4JjciQxKybC2FD7HymwxUK/story.html	[https://perma.cc/UE9E-ANXQ]	(“Tripda	also	features	a	ladies-only	option	for	women	who	would	rather	not	take	a	long	trip	in	the	company	of	a	male	stranger”);	Jay	Barman,	
Sidecar	 Now	 Let’s	 You	 Choose	 Women	 Drivers,	 SFIST	 (Dec.	 19,	 2014),		http://sfist.com/2014/12/19/sidecar_now_lets_you_choose_women_d.php	[https://perma.cc/64SM-RG8M].	The	heightened	intimacy	of	the	sharing	economy	may	increase	demands	for	emotional	labor,	 which	 may	 disproportionately	 burden	 women.	 	 Arlie	 Hochschild	 identified	emotional	 labor	 as	 a	 problem	 in	 the	 traditional	 workplace.	 	 See	 ARLIE	 RUSSELL	HOCHSCHILD,	 THE	MANAGED	HEART:	 COMMERCIALIZATION	 OF	HUMAN	 FEELING	 7	 (2d	 ed.	 2003)	(providing	 the	 seminal	 study	 on	 invisible	 emotional	 labor—work	we	 do	 to	 create	 a	particular	 feeling	or	 state	of	mind	 in	others—and	documenting	a	variety	of	 resulting	harms);	Devon	W.	Carbado	&	Mitu	Gulati,	Working	 Identity,	 85	CORNELL	 L.	 REV.	 1259,	1307	(2000)	(explaining	how	invisible	work	 is	not	rewarded	formally	or	 informally).		Emotional	labor	is	likely	to	be	even	more	of	a	problem	in	the	sharing	economy,	because	there	 is	 more	 direct	 interaction	 between	 buyers	 and	 sellers,	 and	 ratings-based	evaluations	mean	that	sellers	need	to	please	buyers,	and	buyers	need	to	please	sellers.		This	may	have	a	disparate	impact	on	women,	because	women	are	judged	less	favorably	than	men	when	they	provide	support,	and	more	harshly	than	men	when	they	decline	to	 provide	 it.	 	 See	 Madeline	 E.	 Heilman	 &	 Julie	 J.	 Chen,	 Same	 Behavior,	 Different	
Consequences:	Reactions	to	Men’s	and	Women’s	Altruistic	Citizenship	Behavior,	90	J.	APP.	PSYCH.	431,	434-40	(2005).	
	 79.	 See	TASKRABBIT,	supra	note	37.	 	See	 infra	Part	I.B	for	further	discussion	of	how	sharing	economy	firms	themselves	reinforce	these	preferences.	
	 80.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Fair	Housing	Council	 of	 San	Fernando	Valley	 v.	 Roommate.com,	 LLC,	666	F.3d	1216,	1221	(9th	Cir.	2012)	(explaining	that	a	woman	might	prefer	a	 female	roommate	 because	 “[s]he	 might	 also	 worry	 about	 unwanted	 sexual	 advances	 or	becoming	romantically	involved	with	someone	she	must	count	on	to	pay	the	rent.”)	
	 81.	 Id.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 21	enforce	 a	 norm	 of	 no-sex	 between	 members	 of	 the	 same	 sex,	constructing	 same-sex	 spaces	 as	 sex-free	 zones.82	 Although	 recent	changes	 in	 law	 undermine	 these	 heteronormative	 assumptions,	 the	strategy	 persists.83	 	 Given	 the	 intimacy	 of	 the	 shared	 spaces	 of	 the	sharing	 economy,	 both	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 of	 ride-sharing	 and	 home-sharing	 services	 have	 expressed	 preferences	 for	 all-female	 spaces	 to	avoid	the	injection	of	sexuality	there.84	Men	 too	 have	 gender	 preferences	 that	 are	 rooted	 in	 sex	 and	sexuality.		Men	may	prefer	female	service	providers	in	intimate	spaces	as	 a	 way	 to	 avoid	 connotations	 of	 homosexuality,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	men’s	preference	for	female	massage	therapists,85	or	as	a	way	to	inject	sexuality	 into	 the	 transaction,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 restaurants	 like	Hooter’s.86	 	 One	 concern	 with	 allowing	 ride-sharing	 passengers	 to	select	the	sex	of	their	drivers	is	precisely	that	men	would	select	women	drivers	to	engage	in	a	sexually	charged	transaction.87		In	fact,	Uber	has	relied	on	 this	preference	as	a	marketing	device.	 	 In	2014,	 it	offered	a	promotion	 in	 France	 for	 rides	 with	 “Avions	 de	 Chasse”	 (“hot	 chick”	drivers)	 with	 the	 tagline,	 “Who	 said	 women	 don’t	 know	 how	 to	drive?”88	
                                                                                                             	 82.	 See,	e.g.,	Bowers	v.	Hardwick,	478	U.S.	186	(1986).		 83.	 See	Obergefell	 v.	Hodges,	576	U.S.	—-,	135	S.	Ct.	 2584,	2599	 (2015)	 (finding	constitutional	 right	 to	 same-sex	marriage);	 Lawrence	 v.	 Texas,	 539	U.S.	 558,	 578–79	(2003)	(holding	anti-sodomy	laws	unconstitutional).	
	 84.	 See	Winnie	Hu,	New	Service	Offers	Taxis	Exclusively	for	Women,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Sept.	7,	 2014),	 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/nyregion/new-service-offers-taxis-exclusively-for-women.html	 [https://perma.cc/5PWJ-A4NR]	 (a	 driver	 for	 a	 female-only	service	described	the	service	as	akin	to	the	a	female-only	gym	she	joined	after	she	“tired	of	men	flirting	with	her	while	she	was	working	out”).	
	 85.	 See	Allen,	supra	note	65.		 86.	 A	final	reason	for	some	sex	preferences	is	religion.		For	example,	Hasidic	Jewish	women	will	only	ride	with	women	drivers.		See	Hu,	New	Service	Offers	Taxis	Exlusively	
for	women,	supra	note	84.	
	 87.	 See	Barman,	supra	note	78	(“The	only	downside	now,	though,	comes	for	female	Sidecar	 drivers,	 who	 say	 they	 could	 face	 further	 harassment	 from	male	 passengers	who	select	 them	on	purpose	(and,	we	would	guess,	when	drunk?).	 	Because,	yes,	 the	gender	preference	is	available	to	all	users,	male	and	female.”).		 88.	 Rebecca	 Greenfield,	Want	More	 Female	 Uber	 Drivers?	 	 Here’s	 How	 to	 Make	 It	
Happen,	 FAST	 COMPANY,	 http://www.fastcompany.com/3043622/most-innovative-companies/want-more-female-uber-drivers-heres-how-to-make-it-happen	[https://perma.cc/296J-D3GA];	 Schuyler	 Velasco,	Can	Uber	 Solve	 its	women	 problem,	THE	 CHRISTIAN	 SCI.	 MON.,	 http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2015/0310/Can-Uber-solve-its-women-problem	[https://perma.cc/JGS4-ZCQ2].	
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4.	 Safety	Many	 sharing	 economy	 services,	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 intimate	nature	of	where	they	occur—in	a	private	home	or	vehicle—raise	safety	concerns.	 	 Because	 these	 transactions	 occur	 in	 a	 private	 home	 or	vehicle,	usually	with	no	one	else	present	besides	the	buyer	and	seller,	they	 render	both	 the	buyer	 and	 the	 seller	 vulnerable	 to	 physical	 and	sexual	 security	 risks.	 	 And	 the	 close	 private	 quarters	 in	 which	 these	transactions	 take	place	makes	 it	difficult	or	 impossible	 for	a	buyer	or	seller	who	feels	threatened	to	walk	away	or	otherwise	exit.	Safety	concerns	have	been	raised	 frequently	 in	 the	context	of	 ride-sharing	 services,	 and	 affect	 both	 passengers	 and	 drivers.89	 As	 for	passengers,	 ride-sharing	 services	 have	 faced	 a	 slew	 of	 assault	allegations	 against	 their	 drivers.90	 	 Uber,	 for	 example,	 has	 faced	numerous	 complaints	 of	 sexual	 assault	 by	 its	 drivers	 in	 Boston,	Chicago,	 Los	 Angeles,	 Philadelphia,	 San	 Francisco,	 Washington,	 D.C.,	and	other	cities.91		In	December	2014,	an	Uber	driver	in	New	Delhi	was	
                                                                                                             
	 89.	 See	 Reported	 List	 of	 Incidents	 Involving	 Uber	 &	 Lyft,	 WHO’S	 DRIVING	 YOU?,	http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents	[https://perma.cc/NB8B-Q3F4].		 90.	 Perman,	supra	note	54.	
	 91.	 Id.	(describing	among	other	incidents	one	where	an	Uber	driver	in	Houston	was	charged	with	 sexually	 assaulting	 an	 intoxicated	woman	he’d	 pick	 up	 from	 a	 bar	 and	driven	 back	 to	 his	 home);	 Velasco,	 supra	note	 88;	 see	 also	 Steve	Annear,	 et	 al.,	Uber	
Driver	 Charged	 with	 Assault,	 BOSTON	 GLOBE	 (Feb.	 9,	 2015),	http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/02/09/boston-uber-driver-charged-with-indecent-assault-and-battery-boston-police-say/k9eKsX2q95hA9bdM13IorJ/story.html	[https://perma.cc/EDL4-2MX8]	(reporting	multiple	 incidents	 of	 sexual	 assaults	 by	 Uber	 drivers	 against	 female	 passengers,	including	a	rape	and	several	 indecent	assaults);	Sarah	Gray,	Updated:	Uber	calls	what	
amounts	 to	 a	 2-hour	 kidnapping	 an	 “inefficient	 route”,	 SALON	 (Oct.	 14,	 2014),	http://www.salon.com/2014/10/14/uber_calls_what_amounts_to_a_2_hour_kidnapping_an_inefficient_route/	 [https://perma.cc/9V2N-352W];	 Perry	 Stein,	 Uber	 Driver	
Charged	 With	 Sexually	 Assaulting	 Passenger	 in	 D.C.,	 WASHINGTON	 CITY	 PAPER	 (July	 28,	2014),	 http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2014/07/28/uber-driver-charged-with-sexually-assaulting-passenger-in-d-c/	 [https://perma.cc/VRR2-UFVU]	(reporting	on	affidavit	of	passenger	accusing	Uber	driver	of	molesting	her	after	she	passed	out	in	his	car).	Uber	has	other	“women	problem[s].”		Greenfield,	supra	note	88;	Velasco,	supra	note	88;	Anita	Little,	Five	Reasons	to	Delete	Your	Uber	App,	MS.	MAGAZING	BLOG	(Nov.	20,	2014),	http://msmagazine.com/blog/2014/11/20/5-reasons-to-delete-your-uber-app/	[https://perma.cc/X7QN-S57X].	 	 At	 the	 corporate	 level,	 Uber	 is	 known	 for	 a	 “bro-culture.”	 	 Chloe	 Angyal,	Uber’s	 Plan	 to	 Employ	 More	 Female	 Drivers	Won’t	 Empower	
Women,	 THE	 NEW	 REPUBLIC	 (Mar.	 23,	 2015),	https://newrepublic.com/article/121348/ubers-plan-employ-women-drivers-awful	[https://perma.cc/6GJP-55TG].	 	 In	 2014,	Uber	 CEO	Kalanick	 provoked	 ire	 for	 calling	his	 company	 “Boob-er”	 in	 a	 GQ	 profile,	 referring	 to	 the	 role	 that	 Uber’s	 success	 has	played	in	boosting	his	sex	appeal.		Id.		That	same	year,	the	company	apologized	for	its	French	promotion	offering	attractive	women	drivers.		Id.		As	discussed	below,	Uber	has	a	lower	proportion	of	female	drivers	than	any	of	its	major	competitors,	and	few	female	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 23	charged	 with	 kidnapping	 and	 raping	 a	 passenger,	 prompting	 a	temporary	ban	in	that	city.92	Drivers	 too	 face	 safety	 concerns.	 	 While	 ride-sharing	 services	provide	 one	 safety	 advantage	 over	 traditional	 taxi	 driving—being	cashless—they	 still	 present	 dangers	 to	 drivers.93	 	 Female	 drivers	report	 various	 forms	 of	 sexual	 harassment	 by	 riders,	 particularly	 by	intoxicated	 men,	 including	 being	 propositioned	 for	 sex,	 facing	 other	unwanted	come-ons,	and	even	physical	fondling.94		Female	drivers	also	report	 non-sexual	 physical	 assaults.95	 	 And	 female	Uber	 drivers	 have	faced	harassment	from	male	passengers	who	have	located	them	using	the	service’s	“Lost	and	Found”	feature,	which	allows	passengers	to	get	directly	in	touch	with	their	drivers	if	they	believe	they	have	left	behind	their	belongings.96	Other	 sharing	 economy	 services	 also	 pose	 safety	 concerns.	 	 For	example,	AirBnB	hosts	and	guests	face	security	risks.		Guests	have	been	drugged,	sexually	assaulted,	and	held	hostage	by	their	hosts.97	 	Again,	in	 the	 context	of	 roommates,	 the	Ninth	Circuit	 emphasized	 the	 safety	concerns	 of	 shared	 dwellings,	 explaining	 that	 “[w]e	 are	 at	 our	 most	
                                                                                                             executives.		Id.		(noting	that	women	comprise	14%	of	Uber’s	drivers	as	compared	with	30%	 of	 Lyft’s	 drivers	 and	 40%	 of	 Sidecar’s	 drivers,	 and	 that	 of	 Uber’s	 top	 fifty	employees,	only	six	are	women).	
	 92.	 See	Velasco,	supra	note	88.	
	 93.	 See	Greenfield,	supra	note	88.		 94.	 Ellen	Huet,	Why	Aren’t	There	More	Female	Uber	and	Lyft	Drivers?,	FORBES	(Apr.	9,	2015),	http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/04/09/female-uber-lyft-drivers	[https://perma.cc/D5K9-38XJ]	(reporting	among	other	incidents	one	in	January	2015	in	Atlanta	when	an	intoxicated	male	passenger	asked	his	female	driver	to	take	him	to	a	strip	club,	and	if	she	wanted	to	“make	some	extra	money”	by	“danc[ing]	for	him”;	after	she	refused,	the	passenger	rubbed	her	thighs	and	breasts	and	tried	to	kiss	her).	
	 95.	 Id.	 (describing	 incident	 in	 Los	 Angeles	 where	 female	 driver	 alleged	 that	 two	male	passengers	hit	her	in	the	face	with	a	thorny	rose	after	she	asked	them	not	to	slam	her	car	door).	
	 96.	 See	 Johana	 Bhuiyan,	Men	 Are	 Using	 Uber’s	 Lost-And-Found	 Feature	 To	 Harass	
Female	 Drivers,	 BUZZFEED	 (Feb.	 10,	 2015),	http://www.buzzfeed.com/johanabhuiyan/faced-with-harassment-female-uber-drivers-often-left-to-fend#.ojJ9JMAq3	 [https://perma.cc/E985-PWD4]	 (reporting	incidents	where	male	passengers	have	contacted	female	drivers	using	the	feature	and	even	visited	 their	homes	by	using	a	combination	of	 this	 feature	and	Apple’s	Find	My	iPhone	feature).	
	 97.	 See,	e.g.,	Scott	Stump,	Airbnb	Horror	Story	Reveals	Safety	Issues	For	Lodging	Site,	TODAY	 (Aug.	 17,	 2015),	 http://www.today.com/money/airbnb-horror-story-reveals-safety-issues-lodging-site-t39091	[https://perma.cc/5CJF-3EZS];	Marie	Lisa	Jose,	First,	
Listen	 to	My	 Story	 of	 Being	Drugged	 on	 an	 Airbnb	 Stay,	 Then	 Learn	 from	 It,	MATADOR	(Aug.	 13,	 2013),	 http://matadornetwork.com/trips/drugged-and-terrified-an-airbnb-booking-gone-wrong/	[https://perma.cc/5DRA-765Q].	
24	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	vulnerable	when	we	 are	 asleep	 because	we	 cannot	monitor	 our	 own	safety	or	the	security	of	our	belongings.”98	Both	female	service	providers	and	female	consumers	in	the	sharing	economy	have	expressed	preferences	for	transacting	with	women	as	a	way	 to	 mitigate	 these	 safety	 concerns.99	 	 The	 market	 has	 followed.		Several	 ride-sharing	 firms	market	a	 feature	 that	allows	passengers	 to	select	 the	 sex	 of	 their	 driver	 as	 a	 safety	 measure.100	 	 One	 of	 Uber’s	primary	 responses	 to	 the	 safety	 concerns	 has	 been	 to	 pledge	 to	 hire	more	women	drivers.101	
B.	 Manifestations	The	features	of	the	sharing	economy	and	the	sex	preferences	therein	discussed	in	the	last	subparts	have	made	gender	salient	in	the	sharing	economy.		One	notable	feature	of	the	salience	of	sex	in	these	settings	is	that	 sex	 is	 salient	 not	 simply	 as	 a	 product	 of	 unconscious	 biases	 or	structural	features	of	the	market,	which	of	late	have	been	the	dominant	explanations	 for	 continuing	 inequality	 in	 the	market.102	 	Much	 of	 the	
                                                                                                             	 98.	 Fair	Housing	Council	of	San	Fernando	Valley	v.	Roommate.com,	LLC,	666	F.3d	1216,	1221	(9th	Cir.	2012).	
	 99.	 See	Hu,	supra	note	84;	see	Barman,	supra	note	78.	
	 100.	 7	 Ways	 to	 Ride	 Safe	 this	 Season,	 SIDE	 CAR	 BLOG	 (Dec.	 16,	 2014),	http://www.side.cr/seven-ways-to-ride-safe-this-season-with-sidecar/	[https://perma.cc/PM9X-B84L]	 (“Sidecar	 is	 here	 with	 some	 tips	 from	 our	 female	drivers	on	how	to	ride	snug	and	safe	during	the	most	wonderful	(and	busiest!)	time	of	the	 year	.	.	.	Seven	Ways	 to	 Ride	 Safe	 this	 Season	 (with	 Sidecar!)	 	 Be	 Choosy:	 If	 you	prefer	 to	ride	 in	a	newer	car	or	with	a	woman	at	 the	wheel,	go	ahead	and	choose!”);	Bray,	supra	78.	
	 101.	 Meet	the	Uber	Team	Driving	Our	Women	Partner	Program,	UBER	(July	27,	2015),	http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/07/meet-the-uber-team-driving-our-women-partner-program/	 [https://perma.cc/DF8J-ZEWF]	 (one	 million	 women	 drivers	globally	by	2020);	Jessica	Goldstein,	You	Shouldn’t	Have	to	Hire	A	Female	Driver:	Uber’s	
Hiring	 Pledge	 Isn’t	 Enough,	 THINKPROGRESS	 (Mar.	 12,	 2015),	http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2015/03/12/3633002/shouldnt-female-driver-ubers-hiring-pledge-isnt-enough/	 [https://perma.cc/J96U-BDGT].	 	 In	 March	 2015,	Uber	 announced	 a	 partnership	 with	 UN	Women	 in	 its	 goal	 to	 create	 a	 million	 new	driving	 jobs	 for	 women	 by	 2020.	 	 Angyal,	 supra	 note	 91.	 	 After	 barely	 a	 week,	responding	 to	criticism	 from	women’s	rights	and	 labor	groups,	UN	Women	called	off	the	partnership.		Id.	
	 102.	 See,	e.g.,	Katharine	T.	Bartlett,	Making	Good	on	Good	Intentions:	The	Critical	Role	
of	Motivation	in	Reducing	Implicit	Workplace	Discrimination,	95	VA.	L.	REV.	1893,	1895–	96	(2009);	Peggy	C.	Davis,	Law	of	Microaggression,	98	YALE	L.J.	1559,	1561-62	(1989);	Linda	Hamilton	Krieger,	The	 Content	 of	 Our	 Categories:	 A	 Cognitive	 Bias	 Approach	 to	
Discrimination	and	Equal	Employment	Opportunity,	47	STAN.	 L.	REV.	 1161,	1186–1217	(1995);	Charles	R.	Lawrence	III,	The	Id,	the	Ego,	and	Equal	Protection:	Reckoning	with	
Unconscious	Racism,	39	STAN.	L.	REV.	317,	317	(1987);	Ian	F.	Haney	Lopez,	Institutional	
Racism:	Judicial	Conduct	and	a	New	Theory	of	Racial	Discrimination,	109	YALE	L.J.	1717,	1808	(2000);	Ann	C.	McGinley,	Viva	Law	Evolucion!:	Recognizing	Unconscious	Motive	in	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 25	sex	discrimination	and	segregation	that	we	see	in	the	sharing	economy	is	 based	 in	 express	 discriminatory	 preferences	 and	 even	 outright	segregation.103	 	 This	 Subpart	 will	 discuss	 the	 manifestations	 of	 sex-based	preferences	in	the	sharing	economy.	As	 referenced	 above,	 one	 response	 to	 sex	 preferences	 has	 been	discrimination	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 both	 sellers	 and	 buyers.104	 	 Some	ride-sharing	companies	have	allowed	riders	to	select	a	driver	of	his	or	her	preferred	 sex.105	 	One	 long-distance	 ride-sharing	 service,	 Trypda,	also	allows	drivers	to	choose	only	female	passengers.106		These	options	apparently	 have	 been	 quite	 popular.	 	 After	 Sidecar	 introduced	 this	option,	 many	 of	 their	 female	 drivers	 reported	 an	 increase	 in	 ride	
                                                                                                             
Title	 VII,	 9	 CORNELL	 J.	 L.	 &	 PUB.	 POLY’Y	 415,	 421–46	 (2000);	 David	 Benjamin	Oppenheimer,	Negligent	Discrimination,	141	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	899,	902-15	(1993);	Barbara	F.	Reskin,	The	Proximate	Causes	 of	 Employment	Discrimination,	 29	CONTEMP.	 SOC.	 319,	321-23	 (2000);	 Sturm,	 supra	 note	61,	 at	460	 (2001).	 	 For	a	 critique	of	 this	 scholarly	trend,	 see	 generally	 Samuel	 R.	 Bagenstos,	 The	 Structural	 Turn	 and	 the	 Limits	 of	
Antidiscrimination	Law,	94	CAL.	L.	REV.	1	(2006).	Note	that	we	do	also	need	to	be	concerned	about	how	both	conscious	and	unconscious	biases	 operate	 in	 the	 sharing	 economy.	 	 Such	 biases	 can	 work	 their	 way	 into	 both	buyers’	and	sellers’	profiles	by	way	of	ratings.		Abraham	Riesman,	We	Asked	10	Black-
Car	 Drivers	 If	 They	 Prefer	 Working	 for	 Lyft	 or	 Uber—Here’s	 Why	 Lyft	 Won	 By	 a	
Landslide,	 N.Y.	 MAG.	 (Dec.	 7,	 2014),	http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/12/lyft-uber-drivers.html#	[https://perma.cc/B9BD-FBJU]	 (“Nine	 out	 of	 ten	 times,	 it’s	 the	 foreigners	 that	 aren’t	good	at	speaking	English	that	frustrate	a	customer.	If	they’re	trying	to	get	somewhere	and	 the	 language	 is	 a	 barrier,	 it’s	 difficult.	 They	don’t	mean	 to	 give	 the	 driver	 a	 bad	[average]	rating.	But	based	on	communication	skills,	 they’re	giving	you	 the	rating	on	that.”).		These	ratings	are	used	not	only	by	buyers	and	sellers	to	determine	with	whom	to	transact,	but	also	by	sharing	economy	firms.		For	example,	Uber	will	drop	drivers	if	their	 rating	 gets	 too	 low,	 see	 id.,	 and	 Lyft	won’t	match	 a	 driver	with	 a	 rider	 again	 if	either	party	rated	the	other	party	fewer	than	four	stars,	see	Harry	Campbell,	My	Rating	
System	 for	 Uber	 and	 Lyft	 Passengers,	 THE	 RIDESHARE	 GUY	 (Aug.	 31,	 2015),	http://therideshareguy.com/my-rating-system-for-uber-and-lyft-passengers	[https://perma.cc/GM7Q-ZH5F].	
	 103.	 This may flow from the fact that the norms against the expression of sex 
preferences in intimate spaces are far weaker than the norms against, say, race 
discrimination, as we can see in the ongoing sex segregation of certain intimate 
spaces, including bathrooms and locker rooms.  See	Mary	Anne	Case,	All	the	World’s	
the	Men’s	Room,	74	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	1655,	1656	(2007)	(mentioning	her	work	on	“public	toilets	 as	 gendered	 spaces”);	 Mary	 Anne	 Case,	 Toilet	 Survey,	 http://webcast-law.uchicago.edu/toiletsurvey/form/	 [https://perma.cc/VXZ6-54Q3]	 (seeking	 to	gather	 data	 on	 sex-segregated	 toilet	 facilities);	 Mary	 Anne	 Case,	 Changing	 Room?	 A	
Quick	Tour	of	Men’s	and	Women’s	Rooms	in	U.S.	Law	over	the	Last	Decade,	from	the	U.S.	
Constitution	 to	 Local	 Ordinances,	 13	 PUBLIC	 CULTURE	 333	 (2001)	 [hereinafter	 Case,	
Changing	Room?]	(documenting	sex	segregation	of	public	toilets);	Danielle	A.	Schmidt,	
Bathroom	 Bias:	 Making	 the	 Case	 for	 Trans	 Rights	 under	 Disability	 Law,	 20	 MICH.	 J.	GENDER	&	L.	155,	161	(2013)	(discussing	bathroom	segregation	in	the	workplace).	
	 104.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.		 105.	 SIDE	CAR	BLOG,	supra	note	100;	Bray,	supra	78.		 106.	 Bray,	supra	78.	
26	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	requests	 from	 female	 passengers.107	 	 And	 other	 sharing	 economy	services	 that	 allow	 consumers	 to	 select	 workers	 based	 on	 a	 profile	complete	with	name	and	photograph,	such	home-sharing	services	like	AirBnB	 and	 in-home	 task	 services	 like	 TaskRabbit,	 permit	 easy	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sex.	Sex	segregation	is	another	manifestation	of	the	salience	of	sex	in	the	sharing	economy.		Lyft	for	example	began	as	a	ride-sharing	service	for	women	 only.108	 	 While	 Lyft	 ultimately	 decided	 to	 provide	 service	 to	both	 men	 and	 women,	 recent	 taxi	 services	 like	 SheTaxis,	 which	provides	 an	 all-female	 taxi	 service	by	 connecting	 female	drivers	with	female	passengers,	suggests	that	a	sharing	economy	version	is	not	far	behind.109		The	sharing	economy	is	also	marked	by	significant	informal	segregation	 by	 sex.	 Sex	 segregation	 is	 particularly	 marked	 among	drivers	 for	 ride-sharing	 services.	 Women	 constitute	 14%	 of	 Uber’s	drivers,	 30%	 of	 Lyft’s	 drivers,	 and	 40%	 of	 Sidecar’s	 drivers.110	 	 So	while	Uber	claims	to	be	a	job	creator,	it	has	been	a	job	creator	almost	entirely	for	men.111	Safety	 concerns	 contribute	 to	 the	 segregation	 of	 ride-sharing	services	not	only	because	women	avoid	driving	due	to	these	concerns,	but	 also	 because	 these	 concerns—and	 women’s	 attempt	 to	 address	them—end	 up	 making	 driving	 less	 lucrative	 for	 women.	 	 A	combination	 of	 market	 forces	 and	 firm	 policies	 mean	 that	 female	
                                                                                                             	 107.	 Bhuiyan,	 supra	 note	 96;	 Kaleigh	 Rogers,	 Why	 Doesn’t	 Uber	 Let	 Women	
Passengers	 Choose	 Women	 Drivers,	 MOTHERBOARD	 (Apr.	 6,	 2015),	http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-doesnt-uber-let-women-passengers-choose-women-drivers	[https://perma.cc/HS2B-MS9E].		 108.	 Huet,	 supra	 note	 94;	 see	 Rogers,	 Why	 Doesn’t	 Uber	 Let	 Women	 Passengers	
Choose	Women	Drivers,	supra	note	107.		 109.	 SHETAXIS,	 http://shetaxis.com	 [https://perma.cc/8QZV-YAEG].	 	 SheTaxis	 is	 a	livery	 service	 that	 does	 not	 employ	 drivers	 directly,	 but	 joins	 with	 existing	 livery	companies	 that	 employ	drivers	 to	provide	 their	 female	drivers	 to	 female	passengers	seeking	female	drivers.		See	Hu,	supra	note	84.		According	to	SheTaxis,	anyone	can	use	the	 company’s	 services,	 but	 only	 a	 party	 including	 a	 woman	 can	 request	 a	 female	driver;	a	male	passenger	could	be	served	by	a	driver	of	either	sex.			Because	SheTaxis	does	 not	 employ	 its	 drivers,	 the	 company	 avoid	 the	 confines	 of	 employment	discrimination	law.		Under	some	cities’	laws,	it	would	be	illegal	for	a	driver	to	decline	a	fare	because	of	gender.		See	id.		 110.	 Angyal,	supra	note	91;	Rogers,	Why	Doesn’t	Uber	Let	Women	Passengers	Choose	
Women	 Drivers,	 supra	 note	 107.	 	 Note	 that	 at	 least	 some	 of	 these	 firms	 are	 doing	considerably	better	than	taxi	and	livery	drivers	as	a	whole.		Women	make	up	only	14%	of	all	such	drivers	in	the	United	States.		Paul	Merrion,	Making	Inroads:	Women	Cabbies	
on	 the	 Rise,	 CHICAGO	 BUSINESS	 (Sept.	 27,	 2014),	http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSUE01/309279976/making-inroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise	[https://perma.cc/TTV3-M792].		 111.	 Huet,	supra	note	94.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 27	drivers	suffer	financially	when	they	try	to	mitigate	safety	concerns.112		The	 busiest	 times	 of	 the	 week	 for	 ride-sharing	 are	 nights	 and	weekends,	when	drivers	can	make	more	money,	both	because	of	traffic	and	because	of	bonuses	offered	by	ride-sharing	firms	at	these	times.113		But	 these	 are	 also	 the	 times	 when	 riders	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 be	intoxicated.	 Female	 drivers	 who	 opt	 not	 to	 drive	 during	 these	 times	due	 to	 heightened	 safety	 concerns	 thus	 suffer	 disproportionate	financial	 consequences.	 	 And	 female	 drivers	 who	 reject	 male	passengers	who	are	intoxicated	or	otherwise	pose	safety	risks	likewise	suffer	 disproportionate	 losses.	 	 Some	 ride-sharing	 services	 require	 a	90%	 acceptance	 rate	 of	 riders	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 bonuses,	 and	 other	services	 count	 cancellations	 against	 drivers	 in	 their	 ratings.114	 	 Uber	does	not	let	a	driver	block	a	certain	passenger	and	Lyft	only	declines	to	match	a	driver	or	passenger	if	either	has	given	the	other	a	sufficiently	low	 rating.115	 	 Neither	 firm	 routinely	 removes	 passengers	 with	 low	ratings,	though	if	drivers’	ratings	fall,	they	are	let	go.116	There	is	one	market	for	ride-sharing	services	that	is	overwhelmingly	female:	 driving	 children.117	 	 Shuddle,	 which	 is	 essentially	 Uber	 for	children,	 is	comprised	of	98%	female	drivers.118	 	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	for	the	gender	inversion.		First,	drivers	must	have	caregiving	experience,	 which	 is	 more	 common	 among	 women.119	 	 Second,	 the	circumstances	 of	 the	 driving—during	 the	 daytime,	 without	 any	intoxicated	adults—alleviates	many	of	 the	safety	concerns	for	women	drivers,	 and	 may	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 conflict	 with	 their	 own	 caregiving	
                                                                                                             
	 112.	 See	Greenfield,	supra	note	88.		 113.	 Huet,	supra	note	94.		 114.	 Huet,	supra	note	94.	
	 115.	 Id.	
	 116.	 Id.		 117.	 Another	 gig	 economy	 platform	 dominated	 by	 women	 is	 Etsy.	 	 ETSY,	https://www.etsy.com/	 [https://perma.cc/HT78-DNXZ].	 	As	 compared	with	 the	 ride-sharing	 services,	 Etsy,	 a	 micro-entrepreneur	 platform	 that	 allows	 sellers	 to	 peddle	their	 creative	 wares	 through	 the	 site,	 is	 comprised	 of	 88%	 female	 sellers.		Interestingly,	while	Etsy	sellers	report	higher	levels	of	education	than	most	Americans,	the	 average/median	 income	 for	 Etsy	 sellers	 is	 $44,9000,	 ten	 percent	 lower	 than	 the	national	 average/median.	 	 Although	 many	 Etsy	 sellers	 use	 the	 platform	 merely	 to	supplement	 more	 traditional	 income	 sources,	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 these	 sellers	nonetheless	 remain	 below	 average	 in	 income.	 	 See	 Jennifer	 Neeley,	 Is	 the	 Sharing	
Economy	 Feminist,	 SOCIAL	 MEDIA	 TODAY	 (June	 2,	 2015),	http://www.socialmediatoday.com/technology-data/jennifer-neeley/2015-06-02/sharing-economy-feminist	[https://perma.cc/THH2-GV5N].		 118.	 Mike	Isaac,	New	Ride	Services	Forge	Own	Specialized	Paths,	N.Y.	TIMES	BLOG	(June	10,	 2015),	 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/new-ride-services-forge-own-specialized-paths/?_r=0	[https://perma.cc/Y4RQ-PQ5N].		 119.	 Greenfield,	supra	note	88.	
28	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	obligations.120		Finally,	stereotypical	expectations	of	both	workers	and	consumers	 strongly	 type	 this	 sort	 of	 intimate	 caregiving	 service	 as	women’s	work.121	
III.		THE	CONSEQUENCES	FOR	SEX	EQUALITY	The	 merging	 of	 first,	 second,	 and	 third	 places,	 and	 the	 increasing	blurring	 of	 home	 and	 market	 that	 comes	 with	 the	 sharing	 economy	present	 challenges	 for	 legal	 regulation.	 	 As	 legal	 scholars	 have	 long	recognized	(and	critiqued),	current	law	is	organized	largely	around	the	distinction	 between	 the	 family	 and	 market.122	 	 Particularly	 when	 it	comes	to	discrimination,	very	different	law	applies	to	the	home	and	the	market.	 	 In	 the	 home,	 sex	 discrimination	 has	 long	 not	 only	 been	permitted,	 but	 required.123	 	 While	 required	 sex	 discrimination	 has	faded,124	 discrimination	 is	 still	 permissible.125	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	many	 forms	 of	 sex	 discrimination	 are	 prohibited	 in	 the	 labor	market,126	in	the	housing	market,127	and	in	public	accommodations.128	As	set	 forth	 in	 the	 last	 two	Parts,	as	 the	sharing	economy	expands,	the	 nature	 of	 the	 transactions	 and	 the	 context	 in	 which	 they	 occur	make	it	particularly	 likely	that	sex	preferences,	and	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	such	preferences,	will	flourish.	 	There	is	perhaps	an	irony	here:	 as	 law	 has	 become	 less	 accepting	 of	 discrimination	 in	 the	
                                                                                                             
	 120.	 Id.	
	 121.	 See	supra	notes	45-53	(discussing	how	identity	signals	skills	for	certain	work).	
	 122.	 See,	e.g.,	Olsen,	supra	note	24,	at	1498,	1501.		 123.	 We	can	see	this	through	anti-sodomy	laws,	see	Lawrence	v.	Texas,	539	U.S.	558,	578–79	(2003)	(striking	down	sodomy	ban),	and	bans	on	gay	marriage,	see	Obergefell	v.	Hodges,	576	U.S.	__,	135	S.	Ct.	2584,	2599	(2015)	(striking	down	gay	marriage	ban).	
	 124.	 See	 Obergefell,	 135	 S.	 Ct.	 at	 2599	 (striking	 down	 ban	 on	 gay	 marriage);	Lawrence	v.	Texas,	539	U.S.	558,	578–79	(2003)	(striking	down	anti-sodomy	law).		 125.	 No	 law	 bans	 private	 actors	 from	 discriminating	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 romantic	partners	 or	 children	 for	 adoption,	 and,	 indeed,	 the	 constitutional	 right	 to	 intimate	association	 guarantees	 some	 sphere	 of	 liberty	 for	 individuals	 to	 exercise	discriminatory	preferences	 free	 from	government	 interference	 in	 their	most	 intimate	interactions.	 	See	Elizabeth	 F.	 Emens,	 Intimate	Discrimination:	 The	 State’s	 Role	 in	 the	
Accidents	of	Sex	and	Love,	122	HARV.	L.	REV.	1307	(2009)	(discrimination	in	romance);	Kenneth	 L.	 Karst,	The	 Freedom	 of	 Intimate	 Association,	 89	 YALE	 L.J.	 624,	 634	 (1980)	(intimate	association).		The	lack	of	legal	prohibition	even	extends	outside	the	family,	to	certain	domestic	workers	who	labor	in	the	home.	 	See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	10,	at	1231;	Katharine	Silbaugh,	Turning	Labor	into	Love,	91	NW.	U.	L.	REV.	1,	72–79	(1996).		While	Section	1981	bans	race	discrimination	in	contracting,	other	prohibitions	against	discrimination	do	not	apply	against	domestic	workers.		See	id.	
	 126.	 See	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e	(1964).	
	 127.	 See	42	U.S.C.	§§	3601-3631	(1968).	
	 128.	 See	42	U.S.C.	§	2000a.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 29	home,129	 the	 changing	 shape	 of	 the	 economy	 is	 leading	 to	 more	discrimination	in	the	market.	 	The	sharing	economy	thus	may	be	seen	to	pose	a	 threat	 to	 the	 sex	 equality	project	of	 the	market,	 that	 is,	 the	goal	of	ridding	market	transactions	of	the	salience	of	sex	by	eliminating	sex	 discrimination,	 sex	 segregation,	 and	 sex	 stereotyping.130	 	 Before	going	further,	it	is	worth	acknowledging	that	the	sex	equality	project	is	not	 monolithic.	 	 There	 are	 exceptions	 to	 the	 ban	 on	 sex	discrimination,131	 as	 well	 as	 certain	 contexts	 in	 which	 sex	discrimination	 law	allows	for	the	recognition	of	sex	differences	 in	the	market.132		And	of	course	not	everyone	agrees	that	sex	equality	is	best	achieved	by	making	sex	less	rather	than	more	salient	in	the	market.133		Despite	 these	 facets	 of	 sex	 discrimination	 law,	 it	 is	 nonetheless	descriptively	accurate	to	recognize	that	existing	sex	discrimination	law	primarily	aims	to	make	sex	less	salient	in	the	market.	This	Part	 first	discusses	 the	 threat	 that	 the	sharing	economy	poses	to	 the	 legal	 sex	 equality	 project,	 and	 also	 considers	 whether	 the	sharing	 economy	 poses	 any	 promise	 or	 reason	 for	 reconsidering	 the	equality	project.		This	Part	next	discusses	what	role	there	is	for	law	to	intervene.	 	 It	 addresses	 the	 unsettled	 nature	 of	 current	 law,	 market	responses	 in	 the	 face	 of	 this	 uncertainty,	 and	 the	 challenges	 that	 the	sharing	 economy	 poses	 for	 the	 sex	 equality	 project	 even	 if	 current	antidiscrimination	 law	were	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 the	 sharing	 economy,	which	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	antidiscrimination	law	there.	
A.	 Promise	or	Threat?	As	 we	 can	 see,	 sex	 preferences	 have	 flourished	 in	 the	 sharing	economy.	 	 Importantly,	 these	preferences	manifest	 not	 only	 in	 subtle	
                                                                                                             
	 129.	 See	sources	cited	supra	note	126.	
	 130.	 See	Schultz,	supra	note	11,	at	996;	Cary	Franklin,	The	Anti-Stereotyping	Principle	
in	Constitutional	Sex	Discrimination	Law,	85	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	83,	106–108	(2010).		 131.	 I	discuss	the	intimacy-based	exceptions	in	infra	Part	III.B.3.		For	an	interesting	critique	 of	 how	 antidiscrimination	 law,	 through	 its	 exceptions,	 operates	 both	 to	prohibit	 and	 to	 approve	 certain	 forms	 of	 sex	 discrimination,	 see	 Robert	 Post,	
Prejudicial	Appearances:	The	Logic	of	American	Antidiscrimination	Law,	88	CAL.	L.	REV.	1	(2000).	
	 132.	 See	Cal.	Fed.	Savings	&	Loan	Ass’n	v.	Guerra,	479	U.S.	272,	285	(1987)	(holding	that	 Title	 VII	 does	 not	 preempt	 a	 state	 law	 that	 mandates	 benefits	 for	 pregnant	workers	 and	 not	 for	 non-pregnant	 workers	 because	 “Congress	 intended	 the	[Pregnancy	 Discrimination	 Act]	 to	 be	 a	 floor	 beneath	 which	 pregnancy	 disability	benefits	may	not	drop—not	a	ceiling	above	which	they	may	not	rise”).	
	 133.	 See	Schultz,	supra	note	11,	at	996	(discussing	disagreement	among	feminists	as	to	whether	sex	equality	is	best	achieved	by	the	law	recognizing	sex	differences	when	it	comes	to	pregnancy).	
30	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	discrimination	 and	 unconscious	 biases,	 but	 overt	 discrimination	 and	segregation.		This	suggests	not	only	that	norms	are	not	strong	enough	to	 constrain	 sex	 discrimination	 in	 these	 settings,	 but	 that	 norms	 are	sufficiently	 weak	 that	 express	 sex	 preferences	 and	 even	 segregation	are	 considered	 acceptable	 and	 perhaps	 even	 desirable	 (at	 least	 by	substantial	numbers	of	persons).	Some	might	argue	that	the	sharing	economy	holds	promise	in	terms	of	rethinking	the	sex	equality	project.		As	an	initial	matter,	the	sharing	economy	may	lead	us	to	question	the	boundaries	around	the	home	and	the	market	as	 they	 traditionally	have	been	conceived.	 	This	holds	 the	promise	 of	 breaking	 down	 these	 boundaries	 that	 feminist	 legal	scholars	have	typically	found	troubling,	as	these	boundaries	have	often	been	 used	 to	 deny	 protection	 to	 women	 and	 women’s	 work.134		However,	most	feminist	scholars	have	been	concerned	not	simply	with	shifting	 the	 boundaries,	 but	 with	 extending	 the	 protections	 of	 the	public	sphere	to	the	private	sphere.135		If	the	sharing	economy	prompts	recognition	 of	 the	 need	 to	 extend	 more	 market	 protections	 to	 the	home,	 this	 would	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 arguments	 of	 many	 sex	equality	 scholars.136	 	 If,	 instead,	 the	 sharing	 economy	 extends	exceptions	 to	 antidiscrimination	 protections	 for	 market	 activity	because	they	are	viewed	as	sufficiently	private	or	intimate,	this	would	present	a	challenge	to	the	sex	equality	project	as	it	has	primarily	been	conceived.	This	challenge	might	be	supported	with	a	range	of	arguments.		First,	what	 we	 already	 see	 happening	 in	 the	 sharing	 economy	 strongly	suggests	 that	 some	people—especially	women—want	 the	 freedom	 to	exercise	sex	preferences.		Despite	the	sex	equality	project,	there	is	still	a	 strong	 sense	 that	 sex	 preferences	 in	 intimate	 spaces	 within	 the	market,	housing,	and	public	accommodations	are	acceptable—we	can	see	 this	 both	 in	 life137	 and	 in	 law.138	 	 Eliminating	 these	 options	 then	
                                                                                                             
	 134.	 See	Olsen,	supra	note	24,	at	1518–20;	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	10,	at	1174–75;	Silbaugh,	Turning	Labor	into	Love,	supra	note	125,	at	22–26.	
	 135.	 See	sources	cited	id.	
	 136.	 See	sources	cited	supra	note	136.	
	 137.	 See	Case,	Changing	Room?,	supra	note	103	(bathrooms);	Lewin,	supra	note	50;	Allen,	supra	note	65	(massage);	Barry	Gewen,	Sports	and	Sexual	Segregation,	N.Y.	TIMES	BLOG	 (June	 4,	 2008),	 http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/sports-and-sexual-segregation/?_r=0l	[https://perma.cc/8QS7-X9TJ]	(athletics).		 138.	 Title	VII’s	BFOQ	exception	applies	to	sex	but	not	race.	 	See	 infra,	notes	204-10	and	accompanying	text	for	more	on	the	BFOQ	exception.	 	Section	1981	bans	race	but	not	sex	discrimination	in	contracting.		See	42	U.S.C.	§	1981	(1991).		And	of	course	strict	scrutiny	applies	to	race	discrimination	under	the	Constitution,	while	only	intermediate	scrutiny	 applies	 to	 sex.	 	Compare	City	 of	 Richmond	 v.	 J.A.	 Croson,	 488	U.S.	 469,	 494	(1989)	(O’Connor,	J.,	plurality	opinion)	(applying	strict	scrutiny	to	race	classifications),	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 31	may	 actually	 reduce	women’s	 welfare.	 	 And	 there	 may	 be	 trade-offs	between	intimacy	and	equality.		As	one	driver	explained,	she	preferred	working	for	an	all-female	taxi	service	because	she	was	able	to	engage	in	more	 intimate	 transactions	with	 female	 passengers.139	 	 Second,	 an	alternative	 regime	 might	 be	 justified	 if	 the	 circumstances	 of	 certain	market	 transactions	 are	 sufficiently	 different	 that	 they	 justify	 a	different	approach	to	legal	regulation.	 	In	fact,	there	might	be	concern	that	 if	we	 regulate	 sharing	 economy	activities	 too	much	 like	 those	 of	the	traditional	economy	that	the	law	will	 infringe	too	much	on	spaces	where	 we	 currently	 enjoy	 freedom	 from	 regulation.140	 	 Finally,	 one	might	argue	that	allowing	alternative	regulatory	regimes	to	exist	in	the	market	would	provide	 the	benefit	 of	 affording	buyers	 and	 sellers	 the	opportunity	to	opt	 into	the	regulatory	regime	that	best	matched	their	own	preference.141	We	 have	 rejected	 each	 of	 these	 arguments	 in	 the	 traditional	economy.142		Is	there	a	reason	to	accept	them	in	the	sharing	economy?		Believers	in	the	sex	equality	project	would	argue	no.143	While	a	lack	of	
                                                                                                             
with	Miss.	Univ.	for	Women	v.	Hogan,	458	U.S.	718,	724	(1982)	(applying	intermediate	scrutiny	to	sex	classifications).	
	 139.	 See	Hu,	supra	note	84.		 140.	 I	am	not	arguing	specifically	that	a	constitutional	right	to	 intimate	association	applies	in	these	cases,	but	rather	that	as	a	matter	of	practice	these	spaces	are	currently	subject	to	less	regulation.	
	 141.	 See	Molly	 Cohen	 &	 Arun	 Sundararajan,	 Self-Refultaion	 and	 Innovation	 in	 the	
Peer-to-Peer	 Sharing	 Economy,	 82	 U.	 CHI.	 L.	 REV.	 DIALOGUE	 116	 (2015),	https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/self-regulation-and-innovation-peer-peer-sharing-economy	 [https://perma.cc/643J-7RAG]	 (arguing	 for	 different	 regulatory	regimes	for	the	sharing	and	traditional	economies).		But	see	Edith	Ramirez,	Fed.	Trade	Comm’n,	Keynote	Remarks	at	 the	42nd	Annual	Conference	on	International	Antitrust	Law	 and	 Policy,	 Fordham	 Law	 School	 (Oct.	 2,	 2015),	https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/810851/151002fordhamremarks.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/S87N-M9TX]	 (arguing	 to	 “avoid	 creating	 two	distinct	regulatory	tracks—with	one	set	of	rules	for	the	older,	incumbents	businesses	and	 a	 different	 set	 of	 rules	 for	 the	 new	 entrants	 they	 now	 increasingly	 compete	against”).		 142.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 intimacy	 exceptions	 discussed	 infra	 Part	 III.B.3,	which,	at	 least	in	the	traditional	economy,	have	been	recognized	as	quite	narrow	and	have	 been	 applied	 only	 rarely.	 	 See	 29	 C.F.R.	 §	 1604.2(a)	 (2002)	 (“The	 [Equal	Employment	 Opportunity]	 Commission	 believes	 that	 the	 bona	 fide	 occupational	qualification	 exception	 as	 to	 sex	 [discrimination]	 should	 be	 interpreted	narrowly.	 “).		By	contrast,	 recognizing	a	similar	approach	 in	 the	sharing	economy	would	so	greatly	expand	 the	 recognition	 of	 such	 exceptions	 such	 that	 the	 difference	would	 be	 one	 in	kind,	not	just	degree.		 143.	 Scholars	have	addressed	these	arguments	in	the	context	of	other	intimate	work	situations	 and	 have	 made	 a	 persuasive	 case	 rejecting	 them.	 	 See	 Amy	 Kapczynski,	
Same-Sex	 Privacy	 and	 the	 Limits	 of	 Antidiscrimination	 Law,	 112	 YALE	 L.J.	 1257,	 1259	(2003)	 (arguing	 that	 there	 is	 no	 justification	 for	 the	 privacy-based	 BFOQ	 exception	grounded	in	customer	sex	preferences);	Deborah	A.	Calloway,	Equal	Employment	and	
32	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	regulation	would	 increase	 choice	 for	 some,	 it	 would	 decrease	 choice	for	others.	 	We	can	see	 this	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 traditional	economy	when	it	comes	to	male	gynecologists,	where	the	preference	for	female	gynecologists	 has	 seriously	 hindered	 men’s	 ability	 to	 pursue	 this	career	path.144	 	And	of	 course,	 these	sex	preferences	are	grounded	 in	sex-based	 stereotypes.	 	 Allowing	 sex-based	 stereotypes	 to	 have	 a	strong	 hold	 in	 the	 market	 runs	 exactly	 contrary	 to	 the	 sex	 equality	project,	 which	 is	 premised	 significantly	 in	 an	 anti-stereotyping	principle—that	 is,	 that	 we	 should	 not	 classify	 on	 the	 basis	 of	assumptions	about	how	a	man	or	a	woman	will	behave	simply	because	of	sex.145	Under	 this	 anti-stereotyping	 approach,	 there	may	be	 some	 tension	between	 short-term	 and	 long-term	 utility.	 	 The	 anti-stereotyping	approach	is	premised	in	the	notion	that	restricting	reliance	on	sex	will	make	sex	 less	salient	over	 time,	 thereby	reducing	 the	need	 to	rely	on	sex	in	the	future.146		And	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	sex	preferences	are	 not	 fixed	 but	 malleable.	 	 For	 example,	 while	 women	 currently	prefer	 female	 gynecologists,	 this	 preference	 arose	 only	 relatively	recently.147	Until	just	a	few	decades	ago,	when	gynecology	was	a	male	profession,	women	saw	male	gynecologists	without	complaint.148	This	shift	 in	preference	 for	 female	gynecologists	was,	 of	 course,	prompted	largely	 by	 Title	 VII’s	 equal	 employment	 opportunity	mandate,	 which	opened	up	 the	medical	profession	 to	women.149	Thus,	 there	 is	 reason	to	believe	that	consumer	preferences	can	be	responsive	to	the	force	of	law.	And	there	 is	yet	another	reason	why	 law	should	not	simply	accede	to	sex	preferences	in	the	name	of	worker	and	customer	autonomy.		Sex	
                                                                                                             
Third	 Party	 Privacy	 Interests:	 An	 Analytical	 Framework	 for	 Reconciling	 Competing	
Rights,	54	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	327,	329-33	(1985)	(questioning	arguments	supporting	the	BFOQ	 grounded	 in	 customer	 sex	 preferences	 but	 stopping	 short	 of	 arguing	 for	 the	elimination	of	the	BFOQ	exception).	
	 144.	 See	 Lewin,	 supra	 note	 50	 (discussing	 how	 women’s	 preference	 for	 female	gynecologists	has	limited	men’s	future	in	the	field).		The	status	of	the	BFOQ	exception	as	it	applies	to	gynecologists	is	not	clear.		See	Veleanu	v.	Beth	Isr.	Med.	Ctr.,	No.	98	Civ.	7455,	 2000	 U.S.	 Dist.	 LEXIS	 13948,	 at	 *1	 (S.D.N.Y.	 Sept.	 25,	 2000)	 (holding	 that	satisfying	 patient’s	 request	 for	 female	 gynecologist	 does	 not	 constitute	 unlawful	discrimination	without	answering	whether	BFOQ	applies	such	that	the	employer	itself	would	be	barred	from	considering	sex);	EEOC	v.	Mercy	Health	Ctr.,	No.	Civ.	80–1374–W,	 1982	WL	 3108	 (W.D.	 Okla.	 Feb.	 2,	 1982)	 (applying	 BFOQ	 to	 labor	 and	 delivery	nurse).	
	 145.	 See	Franklin,	supra	note	130,	at	106.		 146.	 Id.	at	84-85.	
	 147.	 See	Lewin,	supra	note	50.	
	 148.	 See	id.	
	 149.	 See	Schultz,	supra	note	11,	at	1006–09.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 33	preferences	 cannot	 be	 viewed	 as	 entirely	 exogenous	 or	 fully	 formed	before	 workers	 and	 customers	 enter	 the	 market.	 150	 Rather,	 sharing	economy	firms	play	a	role	in	shaping	preferences.	 	Therefore,	it	is	not	even	 clear	whether	 satisfying	 these	 preferences	 can	 even	 be	 seen	 to	further	the	unmanipulated	interests	of	workers	and	customers.	Some	firms	expressly	suggest	sex	discrimination	as	a	way	to	satisfy	preferences	of	privacy,	 comfort,	 and	safety.151	 	Even	when	such	 firms	do	 not	 expressly	 advocate	 sex	 discrimination,	 they	 nonetheless	 may	reinforce	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	 discriminatory	 preferences.		TaskRabbit’s	 homepage,	 for	 example,	 suggests	 the	 different	 tasks	 for	which	 you	 can	 “Hire	 [a	 tasker]	 for	 a	 Range	 of	 Needs	 Around	 Your	Home.”152	 	 For	 the	 task	 of	 “Cleaning”	 (“We’ll	 make	 your	 home	sparkle!”),	 we	 see	 an	 image	 of	 a	 (white)	 female	 tasker	 cleaning	 a	kitchen,	with	 a	woman	 (presumably	 the	 client)	holding	 a	baby	 in	 the	background	 (representing	 the	 female	 labor	 she	 is	 replacing).153	 	 For	the	 task	 of	 “Moving	Help,”	we	 see	 an	 image	of	 a	 (black)	man	moving	boxes.154	 	These	images	prime	us	for	the	identity	of	the	proper	tasker	for	 each	 task.	 	 For	 the	 task	 of	 “Handyman,”	 (“Taskers	 can	 help	 with	handyman	 tasks	 around	 your	 home.”),	 TaskRabbit	 goes	 further,	making	it	explicit	that	it	is	men	who	should	complete	these	tasks.155		If	“Handyman”	was	not	clear	enough,	we	see	an	image	of	a	(white)	man	with	his	tools.156	As	Professor	Vicki	Schultz	has	made	clear	in	the	case	of	employees,	individuals	 do	 not	 come	 to	 the	 workplace	 with	 fully	 formed	preferences	 about	 work.157	 Rather,	 work	 experiences	 themselves,	which	 are	 largely	 determined	 by	 the	 employer,	 shape	 workers’	expectations	 and	 preferences.158	 This	 is	 no	 less	 true	 for	 consumers,	whose	expectations	and	preferences	are	not	exclusively	formed	before	
                                                                                                             
	 150.	 See	 Allen,	 supra	 note	 65	 (noting	 that	 one	 woman	 believed	 she	 had	 no	preference	 for	 either	 a	 male	 or	 female	 masseuse	 until	 realizing	 that	 with	 a	 female	masseuse	she	was	able	to	relax	more).	
	 151.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.	
	 152.	 See	TASKRABBIT,	supra	note	37.	
	 153.	 Id.	
	 154.	 Id.	
	 155.	 Id.	
	 156.	 Id.	
	 157.	 See	 Vicki	 Schultz,	 Telling	 Stories	 About	 Women	 and	 Work:	 Judicial	
Interpretations	of	Sex	Segregation	in	the	Workplace	in	Title	VII	Cases	Raising	the	Lack	of	
Interest	Argument,	103	HARV.	L.	REV.	1749,	1815	(1990)	(“[W]omen’s	work	preferences	are	formed,	created,	and	recreated	in	response	to	changing	work	conditions”).	
	 158.	 Id.	at	1816	(describing	the	variety	of	mechanisms	employers	use	to	“structure	opportunities	 and	 incentives	 and	 maintain	 work	 cultures	 and	 relations	 so	 as	 to	disempower	most	women	from	aspiring	to	and	succeeding	in	traditionally	male	jobs”).	
34	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	entering	the	market	 for	a	transaction.	 	Rather,	 the	market	can	help	to	shape	 expectations	 and	 preferences	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 intimate	services.159	To	the	extent	that	firms	cultivate	and	reinforce	consumers’	discriminatory	 preferences,	 this	 helps	 to	 shape	 preferences	 by	legitimating	 rather	 than	 disrupting	 such	 preferences,	 particularly	 by	creating	 the	environment	 in	which	 intimate	 services	are	delivered.160		If	 consumers	 have	 their	 preferences	 accommodated,	 this	 reinforces	their	 preexisting	 view	 that	 this	 is	 the	 only	 acceptable	 way	 these	services	may	be	delivered.161	Moreover,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 safety,	 relying	 on	 sex	 preferences	sidesteps	the	underlying	issue,	which	is	a	safety	problem.		The	solution	then	is	not	to	avoid	the	safety	issues	with	sex	segregation	(which	puts	the	burden	on	 the	potential	 victim	of	 the	danger),	 but	 to	 address	 the	underlying	safety	concerns	(which	puts	the	burden	on	those	who	pose	the	safety	risks	and	the	 institutions	responsible	 for	them).162	 	Relying	on	sex	segregation	to	address	safety	problems	in	ride-sharing	services	is	reminiscent	of	single-sex	transit	systems	such	as	women-only	buses	and	subway	cars	in	place	in	other	countries,	including	Egypt,	Iran,	and	Pakistan.163	 	 This	 approach	 is	 entirely	 out	 of	 step	with	 the	 U.S.	 anti-stereotyping	approach	to	sex	discrimination.164	A	final	problem	with	sex-based	classifications	is	that	they	assume	a	neat	 binary	when	 it	 comes	 to	 sex.	 	 In	 an	 era	when	 Caitlyn	 Jenner	 is	gracing	 magazine	 covers	 and	 the	 public	 is	 increasingly	 coming	 to	
                                                                                                             
	 159.	 See	Schoenbaum,	 supra	note	 10,	 at	 1193-96.	 	 Other	 scholars	 have	 recognized	the	role	of	 the	 law	in	shaping	even	our	most	 intimate	preferences.	 	See	Emens,	supra	note	125,	at	1366-74,	for	a	discussion	of	the	law’s	role	in	structuring,	as	she	terms	it,	“the	 accidents	 of	 sex	 and	 love”—the	 likelihood	 of	 dating	 and	marrying	 people	 from	particular	identity	groups.	
	 160.	 See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	10,	at	1193-96.	
	 161.	 See	id.		 162.	 We	can	see	 this	 recognition	by	 the	dissent	 in	 the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	 in	
Dothard	v.	Rawlinson,	433	U.S.	321	(1977).		There,	the	dissent	recognized	that	the	real	problem	in	the	prison	was	its	“barbaric	and	inhumane”	conditions—”conditions	so	bad	that	 state	 official	 have	 conceded	 they	 violate	 the	 Constitution.”	 	 Id.	 at	 342.	 	 The	response	 should	 have	 been	 to	 improve	 these	 conditions	 rather	 than	 to	 ban	 women	from	working	in	them.	
	 163.	 See	 Angyal,	 supra	 note	 91;	 Holly	 Kearl,	 Actually,	 No:	 Women-Only	
Transportation	 Won’t	 End	 Harassment,	 TAKEPART,	http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/08/31/women-only-public-transportation	[https://perma.cc/R3XN-8YT7](noting	 that	 countries	 with	 women-only	 bus	 services	include	Bangladesh,	 Guatemala,	 India,	 Indonesia,	Mexico,	 Pakistan,	 Thailand,	 and	 the	United	Arab	Emirates,	and	that	countries	with	women-only	subway	cars	or	sections	of	trains	include	Brazil,	Egypt,	Iran,	Japan,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	Nepal,	and	Russia).	
	 164.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	125-30.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 35	accept	 transgenderism165,	 this	 is	 an	 especially	 problematic	 solution.		Transgender	 individuals	 have	 already	 troubled	 our	 sex-segregated	spaces,	such	as	bathrooms	and	athletic	facilities.166		A	regime	premised	on	 sex	 is	 likely	 to	 raise	 significant	 classification	 problems	 for	transgender	individuals	and	concerns	about	who	is	a	“real”	woman.167		And	 substantial	 reliance	 on	 sex-based	 classifications	 might	 pose	 a	challenge	 to	 transgenderism,	 which	 relies	 on	 some	 notion	 of	 fluidity	across	the	sexes.168	Finally,	believers	in	the	sex	equality	project	might	be	concerned	that	the	sheer	size	of	the	sharing	economy	poses	too	great	of	a	threat	to	the	sex	 equality	 project	 were	 it	 to	 go	 unregulated	 by	 antidiscrimination	law.	 	 If	 antidiscrimination	 law	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 bulk	 of	 sharing	economy	 transactions,	 this	 creates	 a	 large	 and	 expanding	 segment	 of	market	activity	that	 is	not	subject	to	the	equality	norms	that	typically	govern	work,	housing,	 and	much	activity	 in	 third	 spaces.	 	This	would	affect	not	only	the	sharing	economy,	but	could,	by	affecting	the	norms	of	sex	equality	in	the	market,	undermine	the	role	of	antidiscrimination	law	 in	 transforming	 gender	 relations	 even	 within	 the	 traditional	economy.	
B.	 What	Role	for	Law?	This	Subpart	addresses	what	role	the	law	can	play	in	addressing	the	salience	of	sex	in	the	sharing	economy.		It	is	not	clear	whether	current	
                                                                                                             
	 165.	 See	 Buzz	 Bissinger,	 Caitlyn	 Jenner:	 The	 Full	 Story,	 VANITY	 FAIR	 (July	 2015),	http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/06/caitlyn-jenner-bruce-cover-annie-leibovitz	 [https://perma.cc/5FYH-BMW2]	 (cover	 photo	 of	 Jenner	 done	 by	 Annie	Leibowitz).	
	 166.	 See	 Schmidt,	 supra	 note	103,	 at	161-62.	 	 For	a	 fascinating	discussion	of	 these	issues,	 see	 Michelle	 Goldberg,	 What	 Is	 a	 Woman?,	 NEW	 YORKER	 (Aug.	 4,	 2014),	http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2	[https://perma.cc/5QNC-ZUCR].		 167.	 Goldberg,	supra	note	166.		 168.	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 transgenderism	 actually	 accepts	 and	 reinforces	 the	 sex	binary.	 	 It	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 there	 are	 two	 sexes	 and	 that	 a	 person	identifies	as	either	one	or	the	other.		If	someone	identifies	with	the	sex	not	of	her	birth,	she	may	need	 to	 switch	 sex.	 	 There	 are	 other	 sex	 and	 gender	 identity	 positions	 that	blur	the	line	far	more,	such	as	persons	who	refuse	to	identify	as	either	male	or	female,	or	 even	 persons	who	 feel	 no	 compunction	 to	 have	 their	 gender	 performance	match	their	sex.	 	See	generally	Case,	Disaggregating	Gender	 from	Sex	and	Sexual	Orientation,	
supra	note	5	(1995)	(discussing	the	distinction	between	sex	and	gender,	and	the	legal	implications	 for	 those	whose	gender	does	not	match	 their	sex);	Elinor	Burkett,	What	
Makes	 a	 Woman?,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (June	 7,	 2015),	http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/what-makes-a-woman.html?_r=0	 [https://perma.cc/5QNC-ZUCR]	 (highlighting	 and	 critiquing	 that	transgender	 individuals	 often	 adopt	 very	 stereotypical	 performances	 of	 female	gender).	
36	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	antidiscrimination	 and	 other	 protective	 law	 applies	 to	 the	 sharing	economy.	 	This	Subpart	does	not	seek	 to	answer	 this	question,169	but	briefly	sets	forth	the	terms	of	the	uncertainty.		The	primary	aim	of	this	Subpart	 is	 to	 highlight	 how	 even	 if	 this	 law	 does	 apply,	 there	 are	reasons	to	believe	that	it	will	not	be	as	effective	or	transformative	as	it	has	been	in	the	traditional	economy.		The	sharing	economy	thus	poses	unique	 challenges	 for	 the	 goals	 of	 sex	 equality.	 	 This	 Subpart	 begins	with	a	discussion	of	 current	 law	and	market	 responses,	 then	 turns	 to	the	challenges	that	the	sharing	economy	presents	to	antidiscrimination	law,	and	concludes	with	a	few	suggestions	for	new	legal	approaches	to	address	these	challenges.	
1.	 Current	Law	The	first	set	of	laws	that	would	be	relevant	to	discrimination	in	the	sharing	 economy	 is	 antidiscrimination	 law	 in	 the	 employment,	housing,	 and	 public	 accommodations	 contexts.	 	 These	 laws	 ban	 sex	discrimination.170	 	 But	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 these	 laws	 apply	 to	sharing	 economy	 firms.171	 	 As	 for	 employment	 discrimination	 law,	many	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 have	 argued	 that	 their	 workers	 are	independent	contractors	and	not	employees,	and	thus	that	they	are	not	covered	 under	 these	 laws.172	 	 Litigation	 is	 ongoing,173	 and	 scholars	have	disagreed	on	the	correct	answer.174	
                                                                                                             	 169.	 Other	 scholars	 have	 taken	 on	 this	 task.	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 Benjamin	 Means	 &	 Joseph	Seiner,	 Navigating	 the	 Uber	 Economy,	 49	 U.C.	 DAVIS	 L.	 REV.	 4	 (forthcoming	 2016),	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663350	[https://perma.cc/V88C-9JWY];	Rogers,	The	Social	Costs	of	Uber,	supra	note	7,	at	95.	
	 170.	 See	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e	(1964)	(federal	employment	discrimination	law),	et.	seq.;	42	U.S.C.	§§	3601-3631	(1968)	(federal	housing	discrimination	law);	42	U.S.C.	§	2000a	(1964)	 (federal	 public	 accommodations	 law).	 	 Federal	 public	 accommodations	 law	does	not	bar	sex	discrimination,	but	most	state	 laws	do.	 	See,	e.g.,	Alaska	Stat.	Ann.	§	18.80.200	(West	1964);	Ariz.	Rev.	Stat.	Ann.	§	41-1442	(West	1965);	2015	Cal.	Legis.	Serv.	Ch.	282	(S.B.	600)	(2015);	Colo.	Rev.	Stat.	Ann.	§	24-34-601	(West	1979);	Conn.	Gen.	Stat.	Ann.	§	46a-64	(West	1949).	
	 171.	 See	Rogers,	The	Social	Costs	of	Uber,	supra	note	7,	at	95.	
	 172.	 See	Means	&	 Seiner,	 supra	note	 169,	 at	 2–3;	 Rogers,	The	 Social	 Costs	 of	 Uber,	
supra	note	7,	at	98-99.	 	Note	that	42	U.S.C.	§	1981,	which	bans	race	discrimination	in	contracting,	 should	 operate	 to	 prohibit	 race	 discrimination,	 regardless	 of	 worker	status.	
	 173.	 See,	 e.g.,	 O’Connor	 v.	 Uber	 Technologies,	 Inc.,	 No.	 C-13-03826	 EMC	 (N.D.	 Cal.	Mar.	11,	2015);	Cotter	v.	Lyft,	Inc.,	No.	13-cv-04065-VC	(N.D.	Cal.	Mar.	11,	2015).	
	 174.	 Compare,	e.g.,	Rogers,	supra	note	7,	at	98–99	(questioning	whether	current	law	would	 consider	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 to	 be	 employers,	 but	 arguing	 that	 the	 law	
should	so	cover	them),	with	Means	&	Seiner,	supra	note	169,	at	4	(arguing	that	current	law	is	too	uncertain	to	answer	the	question	and	arguing	for	a	new	standard	based	on	worker	flexibility).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 37	As	 for	 the	 application	 of	 housing	 discrimination	 law	 and	 public	accommodations	 law,	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 have	 likewise	 claimed	that	these	laws	do	not	apply	to	them	because	they	are	not	entities	that	are	regulated	under	the	 law.175	 	Their	status	under	current	 law	is	not	clear.176	 	 Even	 if	 these	 laws	 do	 not	 cover	 firms,	 there	 is	 a	 separate	question	of	whether	individuals	who	open	their	homes	or	cars	or	other	spaces	to	customers	are	covered.	 	But	even	if	 individuals	are	covered,	this	would	have	less	of	an	impact	than	regulating	the	firms	themselves,	as	firms	rather	than	individuals	are	the	entities	with	the	incentives	and	the	 ability	 to	 implement	 effective	 policies	 to	 address	 the	 concerns	raised	above.177	The	second	set	of	laws	that	would	be	relevant	here	is	law	related	to	safety.	 	 For	 safety	 issues	 that	 rise	 to	 a	 serious	 enough	 level,	 criminal	law	could	deter	and	punish,	and	tort	law	could	deter	and	compensate.		But	 because	 the	 institutional	 entity—the	 firm—rather	 than	 the	individual	has	a	much	greater	ability	to	control	and	prevent	harms	and	to	compensate	victims,	effective	use	of	 these	areas	of	 law	would	 turn	on	 institutional	 liability.178	 Sharing	 economy	 firms	 themselves	 might	be	negligent	with	regard	to	allowing	unsafe	users	to	use	their	services,	but	 likely	 only	 if	 they	 knew	or	 should	have	known	of	 the	dangers.179		
                                                                                                             
	 175.	 See	 ADA	 and	 FHA	 Compliance,	 AIRBNB,	https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/898/ada-and-fha-compliance	[https://perma.cc/Y9LZ-ZGAE]	(discussing	that	it	 is	 important	for	U.S.	hosts	(and	not	Airbnb)	to	understand	their	responsibilities	under	the	Fair	Housing	Act).	
	 176.	 See	Rogers,	The	 Social	 Costs	 of	 Uber,	 supra	note	 7,	 at	 95.	 	Compare	 42	 USC	 §	2000a(b)	 (1964)	 (defining	 “place	 of	 public	 accommodation”	 to	 include,	 for	 example,	hotels	and	motels,	restaurants,	and	theaters,	but	not	 transportation	companies),	with	49	CFR	§	37.29	 (1991)	 (“Providers	of	 taxi	 service	are	 subject	 to	 the	 requirements	of	[the	transportation	and	related	provisions	of	Titles	II	and	III	of	the	ADA].”);	DC	Code	§	2-1401.02(24)	(1977)	(defining	“place	of	public	accommodation”	to	include	“all	public	conveyances”).	 	Disability-rights	organizations	have	argued	that	Uber	is	a	taxi	service	under	 the	 Americans	 with	 Disabilities	 Act	 of	 1990,	 and	 therefore	 must	 make	reasonable	accommodations	for	disabled	passengers.	 	See	Complaint	 for	Violations	of	the	Americans	with	Disabilities	Act,	42	U.S.C.	§	12101	et	seq.,	the	California	Unruh	Civil	Rights	Act,	Cal.	Civ.	Code	§§	51	&	52,	and	the	California	Disabled	Persons	Act,	Cal.	Civ.	Code	§§	54–54.3,	National	Federation	of	 the	Blind	of	California	v.	Uber	Technologies,	Inc,	Case	No	3:14-cv-4086,	2014	WL	4628579,	at	*14–20	(N.D.	Cal.	Sept.	9,	2014).		The	Justice	Department	has	 sided	with	 the	plaintiffs.	 	 Statement	of	 Interest	of	 the	United	States	of	America,	National	Federation	of	the	Blind	of	California	v.	Uber	Technologies,	Inc,	Case	No	3:14-cv-4086,	*5	(N.D.	Cal.	Dec.	23,	2014).		 177.	 Individuals	 are	 far	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 sued,	 and	 thus	 they	will	 not	 feel	 as	much	pressure	to	comply	with	any	applicable	law.		And	they	do	not	have	the	resources	or	the	control	to	ascertain	and	implement	effective	safety	and	antidiscrimination	measures.	
	 178.	 See	Reinier	H.	Kraakman,	Vicarious	and	Corporate	Civil	Liability,	in	TORT	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS	134,	134-36	(Michael	Faure,	Ed.	2009)	
	 179.	 See	 Kat	 Greene,	 Airbnb	 Renter	 Says	 Hosts	 Were	 Spying	 With	 Hidden	 Camera,	LAW360	 (Dec.	 15,	 2015),	 http://www.law360.com/articles/737996/airbnb-renter-
38	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	For	 this	 reason,	 effective	 safety	 policies	 would	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 be	forthcoming	 from	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 if	 they	 faced	 vicarious	liability	for	the	torts	of	their	workers.180	Vicarious	liability	will	turn	on	whether	 these	 workers	 are	 in	 fact	 employees,	 which	 again	 is	contested.181	Finally,	 there	 are	 regulations	 aimed	 at	 protecting	 the	 safety	 of	workers	 and	 consumers.182	 	 But	 again,	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 claim	that	these	laws	do	not	apply	to	them	because	they	are	not	the	type	of	entities	that	are	covered	by	such	laws.183	 	These	issues	have	yet	to	be	resolved.184	
2.	 Market	Responses	Whether	 due	 to	 market	 pressure	 or	 worker	 pressure,185	 sharing	economy	 firms	 have	 responded	 to	 some	 discrimination	 and	 safety	concerns	in	ways	that	are	not	required	by	law.		But	the	responses	have	been	inadequate.		Some	firms	prohibit	posting	material	that	“promotes	discrimination,	bigotry,	racism,	hatred,	harassment	or	harm,”	and	will	engage	in	some	monitoring	to	help	enforce	the	policy.186		But	firms	do	
                                                                                                             says-hosts-were-spying-with-hidden-camera	 [https://perma.cc/Y4M2-XTPS]	 (arguing	that	 Airbnb	 doesn’t	 have	 a	 vetting	 process	 and	 bringing	 a	 negligence	 claim	 against	Airbnb).	
	 180.	 See	Talia	G.	Loucks,	Travelers	Beware:	Tort	Liability	in	the	Sharing	Economy,	10	WASH.	J.L.	TECH.	&	ARTS	329,	333	(2015);	see	also	Abbey	Stemler,	Betwixt	and	Between:	
Regulating	 the	 Shared	 Economy,	 43	 FORDHAM	 URB.	 L.J.	 ___	 (forthcoming	 2016),	 8	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656	[https://perma.cc/CH84-ZMFZ].	
	 181.	 See	Id.	at	335;	see	also	Andrew	Deck,	Are	Uber	Drivers	Employees?	The	Growing	
Labor	 Crisis	 in	 the	 “Sharing	 Economy,”	 BROWN	 POLITICAL	 REVIEW	 (Oct.	 14,	 2015),	http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/10/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-growing-labor-crisis-in-the-sharing-economy/	[https://perma.cc/B57J-5TV9].	
	 182.	 See,	e.g.,	Occupational	Safety	and	Health	Act,	29	U.S.C.	§§	651-78;	National	Labor	Relations	Act,	29	U.S.C.	§§	141-197,	142(1).	
	 183.	 See	Stemler,	supra	note	180,	at	9.	
	 184.	 See	 sources	 cited	 supra	 note	 175.	 	 In	 a	 decision	 that	 applies	 only	 to	 the	individual	 employee	 claimant,	 the	 California	 Labor	 Commissioner’s	 Office	 concluded	that	an	Uber	driver	was	an	employee,	not	an	independent	contractor.	 	See	Berwick	v.	Uber	 Techs.,	 Inc.,	 Case	 No.	 11-46739	 EK	 (June	 3,	 2015),	http://www.scribd.com/doc/268911290/Uber-vs-Berwick	 [https://perma.cc/2MJ8-XATD].		Uber	has	appealed	this	decision.		See	Uber	Techs.	v.	Berwick,	Case	No.	CGC-15-546378	(Cal.	 Sup.	Ct.	 June	16,	2015),	http://www.scribd.com/doc/268911290/Uber-vs-Berwick	[https://perma.cc/2MJ8-XATD].	
	 185.	 See	 Rogers,	 The	 Social	 Costs	 of	 Uber,	 supra	 note	 7,	 at	 96-97,	 99	 (citing	associations	of	Uber	drivers	and	how	work	stoppage	changed	Uber	behavior).		 186.	 Harman,	supra	note	56.		In	one	instance,	AirBnB	removed	a	listing	that	banned	gay	couples.		Nick	Duffy,	Accomodation	website	Airbnb	removes	listing	that	banned	gay	
couples,	 PINKNEWS	 (Nov.	 23,	 2014),	http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2014/11/23/accomodation-website-airbnb-removes-
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 39	not	 engage	 in	 nearly	 enough	monitoring	 to	 ensure	 that	 users	 do	 not	discriminate,	not	only	in	the	posting	of	material,	but	in	the	remainder	of	their	transactions.187			And	of	course	at	least	some	of	these	firms	are	playing	 a	 role	 in	 cultivating	 discrimination,	 either	 specifically	 by	relying	 on	 sex	 discriminatory	 mechanisms,	 or	 by	 activating	discriminatory	preferences.188	Sharing	 economy	 firms	 have	 taken	 action	 in	 response	 to	 safety	concerns,	but	these	responses	too	have	been	inadequate.		For	example,	Uber	 and	 other	 ridesharing	 services	 vet	 their	 drivers	 by	 relying	 on	private	 firms	 that	 conduct	 criminal	 background	 checks.189	 	 But	 the	firms	 have	 been	 criticized	 for	 incomplete	 background	 checks	 after	finding	 drivers	with	 criminal	 histories.190	 	 And	 this	 falls	 short	 of	 the	measures	required	 in	many	cities	 to	ensure	 the	safety	of	 taxi	drivers:	finger-printing	 to	 check	 their	 status	 on	 federal	 databases	 of	 violent	offenders	 and	 drug-testing.191	 	 Uber	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 emergency	number	for	passengers	who	feel	threatened	by	drivers;	the	only	way	to	contact	the	firm	is	by	email.192		Nor	has	the	company	removed	from	its	system	 passengers	 who	 have	 been	 reported	 to	 sexually	 harass	drivers.193	 	 In	 December	 2014,	 Uber	 updated	 its	 safety	 policy,	 and	began	 charging	 a	 safety	 surcharge	 to	 all	 rides.194	 	 But	 assaults	 have	continued	even	after	the	revamp.195	
                                                                                                             listing-that-banned-gay-couples/	[https://perma.cc/QK4A-ZY68].		AirBnB just rolled 
out new measures to combat discrimination, but it is too soon to assess their 
efficacy.  See Katie Benner, AirBnB Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by Its 
Hosts, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html 
(reporting that the company would require rental hosts to agree to a “community 
commitment” to comply with a new nondiscrimination policy and would try to 
reduce reliance on user photographs).		 187.	 Lyft	doesn’t	track	users’	race	or	gender,	but	they	monitor	drivers	to	make	sure	they	aren’t	denying	a	 large	number	of	 requests	 to	particular	group.	 	 If	 so,	 this	might	lead	 to	 investigation	 of	 driver.	 Harman,	 supra	 note	 56;	 Wortham,	 supra	 note	 58.		However,	 most	 firms	 do	 not	 engage	 in	 any	 sort	 of	 comprehensive	 monitoring	 and	auditing	that	could	help	to	reduce	discrimination.	
	 188.	 See	supra	notes	104-121	and	accompanying	text.	
	 189.	 See	Perman,	supra	note	54.	
	 190.	 See	 id.;	 Carmel	 DeAmicis,	 Exclusive:	 Uber	 driver	 accused	 of	 assault	 had	 done	
prison	 time	 for	 a	 felony,	 passed	 background	 check	 anyways,	 PANDO	 (Jan.	 6,	 2014),	https://pando.com/2014/01/06/exclusive-uber-driver-accused-of-assault-passed-zero-tolerance-background-check-despite-criminal-history/	 [https://perma.cc/79B3-MC23].	
	 191.	 See	Perman,	supra	note	54.	
	 192.	 See	id.	
	 193.	 See	Rogers,	The	Social	Costs	of	Uber,	supra	note	7.	
	 194.	 Uber’s	 ‘safe	 ride	 fee’	 becomes	 ‘booking	 fee’	 after	 $25m	 settlement	 over	 rider	
safety,	 THE	 GUARDIAN	 (Apr.	 7,	 2016),	
40	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	AirBnB	 has	 tried	 to	 increase	 consumer	 and	 host	 protections	 by	doing	more	to	verify	the	personal	aspects	of	the	transaction.		The	firm	has	 added	 protections	 to	 ensure	 that	 online	 profiles	 match	 real-life	identities.196	 	 The	 “Verified	 ID”	 function	 matches	 users’	 online	identities	(for	example,	through	existing	AirBnB	reviews	or	Facebook)	and	offline	documentation,	such	as	scanning	official	identification,	like	a	 driver’s	 license.197	 	 But	 the	 scheme	 is	 not	 yet	 obligatory	 unless	booking	last	minute.198	Note	 that	market	pressures	may	push	 at	 least	 some	 firms	 towards	classifying	 their	workers	 as	 employees	 and	 bringing	 them	within	 the	dictates	 of	 employment	 law.	 	 While	 working	 with	 independent	contractors	 allows	 firms	 to	 avoid	 the	 minimum	 wage	 and	 other	expensive	 protections	 that	 come	 along	 with	 employment	 status,	 it	comes	 at	 a	 cost.	 	 The	 demise	 of	 at	 least	 one	 sharing	 economy	 firm,	Homejoy,	 a	 home	 cleaning	 service,	 has	 been	 attributed	 to	 the	 lack	 of	control	 they	 exercised	 over	 their	workers,	 leading	 to	 inferior	 service	and	 dissatisfied	 customers.199	 	 A	 few	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 have	voluntarily	 shifted	 their	 workers	 from	 independent	 contractors	 to	employees	because	they	deemed	control	over	their	workers	necessary	for	 the	 success	 of	 their	 business.200	 	 While	 this	 voluntary	reclassification	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 adopted	 by	 most	 firms,	 these	
                                                                                                             https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/07/uber-driver-background-check-lawsuit-passenger-safety-california	 [https://perma.cc/8RUD-L6NX];	 Perman,	
supra	 note	 54	 (explaining	 that	 the	 fee	 goes	 toward	 background	 checks,	 vehicle	screenings,	driver	education,	and	the	development	of	additional	safety	features).	
	 195.	 See	Velasco,	supra	note	88.		 196.	 Paul	Brady,	Six	Tips	for	First-Time	Airbnb	Renters,	CONDE	NAST	TRAVELER	(Jan.	14,	2014),	http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2014-01-14/six-tips-for-first-time-airbnb-renters	[https://perma.cc/5ZBH-WW3N].	 	See	Strahilevitz,	supra	note	60,	at	1705,	on	how	anonymity	in	the	context	of	driving	leads	to	worse	behavior.		 197.	 What	is	Verified	ID?,	UBER,	https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/450/what-is-verified-id	[https://perma.cc/5X7U-ENUS].		 198.	 Airbnb	 Help,	 I’m	 a	 host.	 What	 are	 some	 safety	 tips	 I	 can	 follow?,	 AIRBNB,	https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/231/i-m-a-host—what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow	 [https://perma.cc/3DXU-HGRB];	 Airbnb	Help,	 I’m	 a	 guest.	What	 are	 some	
safety	 tips	 I	 can	 follow?,	 AIRBNB,	 https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/241/i-m-a-guest—what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow	[https://perma.cc/9KQ6-FJG5].	
	 199.	 See	 Ellen	 Huet,	What	 Really	 Killed	 Homejoy?	 	 It	 Just	 Couldn’t	 Hold	 on	 to	 Its	
Customers,	 FORBES	 (July	 23,	 2015),	http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers	[https://perma.cc/YWD7-7KKX].	
	 200.	 See	Ellen	Huet,	The	Price	Of	Control:	On-Demand	Shipping	Service	Shyp	Converts	
Its	 Couriers	 To	 Employees,	 FORBES	 (July	 1,	 2015),	http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/on-demand-shipping-service-shyp-converts-its-couriers-to-employees/	 [https://perma.cc/LGK7-XBZV].	 	 On	 the	general	question	of	 the	 firm’s	make/buy	decision,	 see	 the	seminal	Ronald	Coase,	The	
Nature	of	the	Firm,	4	ECONOMICA	386	(1937).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 41	examples	reveal	at	 least	some	counter-pressure	 from	the	market	 that	would	limit	independent	contracting	even	in	the	sharing	economy.	
3.	 Challenges	for	Law	Even	 if	 antidiscrimination	 law	does	 apply	 to	 the	 sharing	 economy,	either	under	current	doctrine	or	by	expansion	of	the	law	to	new	types	of	 working	 relationships,	 such	 as	 “dependent	 contractors,”201	 it	 will	still	not	address	all	of	 the	manifestations	of	 the	 salience	of	 sex	 in	 the	sharing	economy.		This	is	for	a	number	of	reasons	related	to	the	nature	of	 transactions	 in	 the	 sharing	economy.	 	 First,	 intimacy	exceptions	 to	antidiscrimination	 law	 will	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 relevant	 in	 the	 sharing	economy,	 as	 will	 the	 lack	 of	 protection	 against	 customer	discrimination.202	 	 Second,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 more	 importantly	(because	 these	 intimacy	 exceptions	 could	 be	 eliminated,	 at	 least	 in	theory),	even	when	antidiscrimination	law	applies,	structural	features	of	the	sharing	economy	make	antidiscrimination	law	less	effective	and	reduce	the	law’s	potential	to	have	the	transformative	effect	that	it	has	had	 in	 the	 traditional	 economy.	 	 These	 challenges	 that	 the	 sharing	economy	poses	to	sex	discrimination	law	are	discussed	in	turn.	First,	 exceptions	 to	 and	 gaps	 in	 antidiscrimination	 law	 will	 be	particularly	 likely	 to	 be	 relevant	 to	 sharing	 economy	 transactions.		Employment	 discrimination	 law	 contains	 a	 “bona	 fide	 occupational	qualification”	 (BFOQ)	 exception	 to	 certain	 intimate	 work	circumstances.203	 	 Employers	 relying	 on	 sex	 segregation	 to	 address	safety	concerns	in	settings	of	intense	intimacy	is	not	unheard	of	in	U.S.	law.	 	 One	 of	 the	 seminal	 early	 Title	 VII	 sex	 discrimination	 cases,	
Dothard	v.	Rawlinson,	was	decided	precisely	on	this	ground.204		In	that	
                                                                                                             
	 201.	 See	 Lauren	 Weber,	 What	 if	 There	 Were	 a	 New	 Type	 of	 Worker?	 Dependent	
Contractor,	 WALL	 ST.	 J.	 (Jan.	 18,	 2015),	 http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831	[https://perma.cc/HFD9-8ZR3].		 202.	 Some	 of	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 law	 here	 would	 apply	 equally	 to	 the	 traditional	economy.		Occupational	segregation	has	proven	quite	resistant	to	legal	challenge.		See	EEOC	v.	Sears,	839	F.2d	302,	320-21	(1988)	(crediting	the	 lack	of	 interest	defense	to	reject	 Title	 VII	 sex	 discrimination	 claim	 based	 in	 occupational	 segregation);	 Schultz,	
supra	 note	 11,	 at	 1048-1066,	 1109	 (critiquing	 the	 lack	 of	 interest	 defense).	 	 Even	though	 some	 sharing	 economy	 firm	policies	 (e.g.,	 bonuses	 for	 driving	 at	 night	 or	 for	acceptance	 rates)	 might	 be	 subject	 to	 disparate	 impact	 challenges,	 these	 are	notoriously	 difficult	 to	 win.	 	 See	Michael	 Selmi,	Was	 the	 Disparate	 Impact	 Theory	 a	
Mistake?,	53	UCLA	L.	REV.	701,	735,	738–40	(2006)	(documenting	low	success	rates	of	disparate	impact	claims).	
	 203.	 See	42	U.S.C.	 §	 2000-2(e)(1)	 (1964);	 Schoenbaum,	The	 Law	of	 Intimate	Work,	
supra	note	10,	at	1190.		 204.	 433	U.S.	321	(1977).	
42	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	case,	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 an	 employer	 could	 rely	 on	 sex	 as	 a	qualification	 for	 the	 position	 of	 correctional	 officer	 because	 the	dangers	 that	women	made	them	unfit	 for	 the	 job.205	 	Dothard	may	be	distinguished,	as	prisons	are	already	premised	on	the	sex	segregation	of	 prisoners.206	 	 And	 a	 later	 decision	 by	 the	 Court	 rejected	 a	 BFOQ	defense	 that	 turned	 on	 the	 argument	 that	 sex	 discrimination	 was	necessary	 to	 protect	 women	 workers.207	 	 But	 the	 possibility	 for	exceptions	based	on	intimacy	remains,	not	only	due	to	safety	concerns,	but	also	due	to	interests	in	privacy208	and	sexual	titillation.209	Intimacy	exceptions	also	exist	under	fair	housing	law.		First,	federal	housing	 law	 contains	 a	 so-called	 “Mrs.	 Murphy”	 exception,	 which	exempts	 from	 antidiscrimination	 mandates	 dwellings	 intended	 to	 be	occupied	 by	 four	 or	 fewer	 families	 if	 the	 owner	 lives	 in	 one	 of	 the	units.210	 	Note,	 however,	 that	 even	 a	Mrs.	Murphy	 landlord	must	 still	comply	 with	 fair	 housing	 law’s	 ban	 on	 posting	 discriminatory	advertisements.211	 	 Second,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 at	 least	 one	 federal	
                                                                                                             
	 205.	 Id.	 at	335	 (“A	woman’s	 relative	ability	 to	maintain	order	 in	a	male,	maximum	security,	 unclassified	 penitentiary	 of	 the	 type	 Alabama	 now	 runs	 could	 be	 directly	reduced	by	her	womanhood.	There	 is	 a	basis	 in	 fact	 for	expecting	 that	 sex	offenders	who	have	 criminally	 assaulted	women	 in	 the	past	would	be	moved	 to	do	 so	 again	 if	access	 to	women	were	established	within	the	prison.	There	would	also	be	a	real	risk	that	 other	 inmates,	 deprived	 of	 a	 normal	 heterosexual	 environment,	 would	 assault	women	guards	because	they	were	women.”).	
	 206.	 See	David	S	Cohen,	Keeping	Men	“Men”	and	Women	Down:	Sex	Segretation,	Anti-
Essentialism,	 and	 Masculinity,	 25	 HARV.	 J.L.	 &	 GENDER	 509,	 514	 (2010)	 (citing	 state	statutes).	
	 207.	 See	United	Auto	Workers	 v.	 Johnson	 Controls,	 499	U.S.	 187	 (1991)	 (rejecting	BFOQ	defense	in	case	where	employer	banned	fertile	female	employees	from	working	with	chemicals	that	presented	safety	risks	to	fetuses).		 208.	 At	their	most	substantial,	these	privacy	interests	arise	in	contexts	where	female	customers	express	preferences	 for	 female	workers	so	as	 to	avoid	genital	exposure	to	male	workers.	 	Title	VII	has	drawn	the	line	in	interpreting	the	BFOQ	exception	to	sex	discrimination	based	in	customer	privacy	preferences	here.		Compare	Norwood	v.	Dale	Maint.	Sys.,	Inc.,	590	F.	Supp.	1410	(N.D.	Ill.	1984)	(attendants	responsible	for	cleaning	bathrooms);	Brooks	v.	ACF	 Indus.	 Inc.,	 537	F.	 Supp.	1122	 (S.D.	W.	Va.	 1982)	 (janitor	responsible	for	cleaning	bathrooms);	EEOC	v.	Mercy	Health	Ctr.,	No.	Civ.	80–1374–W,	1982	WL	3108	(W.D.	Okla.	Feb.	2,	1982)	(labor	and	delivery	nurse);	Backus	v.	Baptist	Med.	Ctr.,	510	F.	Supp.	1191	(E.D.	Ark.	1981),	vacated	as	moot,	671	F.2d	1100	(8th	Cir.	1982)	 (same),	with	Olsen	 v.	 Marriott	 Int’l,	 Inc.,	 75	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 1052	 (D.	 Ariz.	 1999)	(denying	 BFOQ	 for	 massage	 therapist);	 EEOC	 v.	 Sedita,	 816	 F.	 Supp.	 1291	 (N.D.	 Ill.	1993)	 (denying	BFOQ	 for	health	 club	 instructors);	EEOC	v.	HI	40	Corp.,	953	F.	 Supp.	301	(W.D.	Mo.	1996)	(denying	BFOQ	for	weight-loss	center	counselors).	
	 209.	 See	 Wilson	 v.	 Southwest	 Airlines,	 517	 F.	 Supp.	 292	 (N.D.	 Tex.	 1981);	 see	
generally	 Kimberly	 A.	 Yuracko,	 Private	 Nurses	 and	 Playboy	 Bunnies:	 Explaining	
Permissible	 Sex	 Discrimination,	 92	 CALIF.	 L.	 REV.	 147	 (discussing	 and	 explaining	 the	more	lenient	approach	to	privacy	preferences	than	titillation	preferences).		 210.	 42	U.S.C.	§	3603(b)(2)	(1968).	
	 211.	 See	id.	At	§	3603(c).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 43	appellate	court	has	held	that	the	right	to	intimate	association	protects	roommate	 relationships	 such	 that	 antidiscrimination	 law	 cannot	intervene	in	these	decisions.212	Antidiscrimination	 law	 also	 lacks	 protection	 against	 customer	discrimination,213	 which	 is	 particularly	 likely	 to	 arise	 in	 the	 sharing	economy	given	that	it	 is	service	oriented,	and	that	the	intimacy	of	the	transactions	tends	to	stoke	discriminatory	preferences.		Not	only	does	antidiscrimination	law	contain	no	ban	on	customer	discrimination	per	se,	 but	 it	 also	does	 little	 to	 stand	 in	 the	way	of	 employers	 cultivating	and	reinforcing	discriminatory	preferences	in	customers.214	Second,	structural	features	of	the	sharing	economy	will	tend	to	make	antidiscrimination	law	less	effective	there.		One	of	the	primary	benefits	for	which	employment	discrimination	law	has	been	justly	celebrated	is	providing	 a	 place	 of	 integration.215	 	 Professor	 Cynthia	 Estlund	 has	argued	 that	 the	 application	 of	 antidiscrimination	 mandates	 in	 the	workplace	has	created	a	space	where	coworkers	can	come	together	in	a	 more	 integrated	 setting	 than	 they	 would	 otherwise	 find	 in	 their	neighborhoods,	 schools,	 or	 other	 third	 places	 of	 public	accommodation.216	 	Relying	on	the	contact	hypothesis,	Estlund	argues	that	 this	 means	 that	 employment	 discrimination	 law	 plays	 a	 critical	role	in	improving	race	relations	and	race	equality	norms.217	While	 Estlund’s	 focus	 is	 on	 race,	 we	 can	 expand	 her	 argument	 to	gender.	 	One	might	think	that	men	and	women	already	have	plenty	of	contact	 in	the	home	and	in	a	variety	of	third	places	such	as	bars.	 	But	what	the	workplace	setting	and	employment	discrimination	law	bring	are	 an	 opportunity	 for	 men	 and	 women	 to	 interact	 as	 coworkers	 in	settings	 where	 norms	 of	 equality	 prevail,	 allowing	 the	 interaction	 to	change	the	nature	of	gender	relations	 in	a	way	that	does	not	occur	 in	
                                                                                                             
	 212.	 See	 supra,	notes	 97-98	 and	 accompanying	 text.	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 it	 is	 not	clear	whether	 this	decision	would	apply	 to	 shared	dwellings	 in	 the	 sharing	economy	context	because	those	relationships	are	not	as	intimate	due	to	their	shorter	duration.	
	 213.	 See	Schoenbaum,	The	Law	of	Intimate	Work,	supra	note	10,	at	1189–91;	Bartlett	&	 Gulati,	 Discrimination	 by	 Customers	 (Nov.	 13,	 2015),	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540334	[https://perma.cc/SCS6-53N9].	 	Because	42	U.S.C.	§	1981	bans	race	discrimination	in	contracting,	it	would	apply	to	customer	discrimination,	but	it	has	never	been	deployed	this	 way.	 	 See	 Bartlett	 &	 Gulati,	 supra,	 at	 4	 n.8;	 IAN	 AYRES,	 PERVASIVE	 PREJUDICE:	UNCONVENTIONAL	EVIDENCE	OF	RACE	AND	GENDER	DISCRIMINATION	127-36	(2001)	(discussing	how	§	1981	could	apply	to	customer	discrimination).	
	 214.	 See	supra,	text	accompany	notes	159-60.	
	 215.	 See	Cynthia	L.	Estlund,	Working	Together:	The	Workplace,	Civil	Society,	and	the	
Law,	89	GEO.	L.J.	1,	8	(2000).	
	 216.	 Id.	
	 217.	 Id.	at	19.	
44	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	other	 settings.	 	We	 can	 see	 the	 role	 that	 law	 has	 played	 in	 changing	norms	of	male-female	interaction	quite	clearly	in	the	context	of	sexual	harassment.218	Critically,	 however,	 employment	 discrimination	 law’s	 role	 in	changing	these	norms	turns	not	only	on	the	law	itself,	but	also	on	the	structural	features	of	the	workplace	in	which	the	law	operates.		Part	of	the	 mechanism	 by	 which	 antidiscrimination	 law	 changes	 norms	 is	through	the	presence	of	coworkers	and	the	contact	that	they	have	with	each	 other.219	 Building	 relationships	 in	 a	 context	 of	 equality	 helps	 to	improve	race	and	gender	relations.		But	in	the	sharing	economy,	even	if	the	law	applies,	there	is	no	workplace	and	no	coworkers.	 	What	is	left	is	the	relationship	between	the	seller	and	the	buyer.		There	is	reason	to	believe	 that	 the	 application	 of	 antidiscrimination	 law	 in	 this	 type	 of	setting	will	not	have	so	beneficial	an	effect	on	norms.		In	such	settings,	interactions	 between	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 take	 place	 in	 a	 context	 of	hierarchy,	 and	 are	 not	 as	 regular	 as	 those	 of	 the	 daily	 interactions	between	coworkers.220	The	 lack	 of	 coworkers	 may	 also	 undermine	 the	 enforcement	 of	antidiscrimination	 law.221	 	 As	 an	 initial	matter,	 given	 the	 reliance	 on	comparators	as	the	primary	mechanism	for	proving	discrimination,222	it	 is	 unclear	 how	 discrimination	 would	 even	 be	 established	 in	 many	cases	 in	 the	 sharing	 economy.	 	Moreover,	 because	 antidiscrimination	law	 turns	 largely	 on	 private	 rights	 of	 enforcement,	 workers’	 legal	consciousness	must	be	raised	for	a	legal	violation	to	be	recognized	and	a	claim	to	be	made	in	the	first	instance.223		With	this	understanding	of	the	 enforcement	 of	 employment	 discrimination	 law,	 coworkers	become	a	critical	part	of	the	enforcement	mechanism.	
                                                                                                             
	 218.	 See	Nadler	&	Bilz,	supra	note	13,	at	101.	
	 219.	 See	Estlund,	Working	Together,	supra	note	215,	at	19.	
	 220.	 See	id.	at	25	(describing	the	conditions	in	which	the	contact	hypothesis	is	likely	to	hold	true,	including	conditions	of	regular	interaction	and	non-hierarchy).	
	 221.	 See	 Naomi	 Schoenbaum,	 Coworkers	 in	 Law	 (unpublished	 manuscript	 arguing	that	coworkers	are	essential	to	work	law	and	work	life,	including	through	aiding	in	the	enforcement	of	work	law).	Note	 that	 one	 sector	 of	 the	 sharing	 economy—the	 co-working	 firm—would	 provide	workers	 with	 something	 like	 coworkers,	 even	 when	 workers	 are	 self-employed	 or	labor	for	different	firms.	 	See	Davidson	&	Infranca,	supra	note	6,	at	15-16	(discussing	the	phenomena	of	co-working	firms).	
	 222.	 See	Suzanne	B.	Goldberg,	Discrimination	by	Comparison,	120	YALE	L.J.	728,	750	(2011).	
	 223.	 See	 Amy	 Blackstone,	 et	 al.,	 Legal	 Consciousness	 and	 Responses	 to	 Sexual	
Harassment,	 43	 L.	 &	 SOC’Y	 REV.	 631	 (2009)	 (discussing	 the	 importance	 of	 legal	consciousness	to	rights	claiming).	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 45	First,	the	support	that	coworkers	provide	raises	legal	consciousness.		“[T]he	 presence	 of	 close	 work	 friends	.	.	.	is	 a	 strong	 and	 consistent	predictor	 of	 [legal]	 mobilization.”224	 Because	 coworkers	 have	 often	undergone	similar	experiences,	they	are	thus	well	placed	to	confirm	a	worker’s	 sense	 of	 a	 violation,	 a	 necessary	 precondition	 to	 exercising	voice.225	 	 And	 talking	 to	 coworkers	who	 have	 already	 complained	 to	the	 employer	 can	 lead	 a	worker	 to	 see	 that	 she	 too	 “can	 speak	 up	 if	something	 like	 this	 happens.”226	 	 Coworkers’	 experience	 also	 allows	them	to	provide	informed	guidance	about	possible	rights’	violations.227		Obtaining	 such	 information	 is	 essential	 before	 complaining	 of	discrimination	 because	 retaliation	 protection	 attaches	 only	 once	 the	employee	reasonably	believes	there	has	been	a	violation.228			Second,	 mutually	 supportive	 behavior	 that	 arises	 from	 coworker	bonds	 sets	 the	 stage	 for	 collective	 action	 that	 helps	 to	 enforce	antidiscrimination	 law.229	 	This	 is	 especially	 important	 given	 the	 role	that	the	fear	of	retaliation	plays	in	deterring	workers	from	challenging	discrimination.230	When	 a	 group	 of	 employees	 complain,	 it	 is	 harder	for	 the	 employer	 to	pin	 the	blame	on	 any	 individual	worker,	 and	 the	employer	may	be	unwilling	to	terminate	or	otherwise	retaliate	against	a	large	swath	of	workers.	Third,	strong	coworker	relationships	obviate	the	need	for	complaint	by	preventing	violations	from	occurring	 in	the	first	place.	 	Supportive	work	 cultures	 with	 high	 coworker	 solidarity	 have	 been	 linked	 with	lower	incidences	of	sexual	harassment.231	The	 structural	 features	 that	 make	 many	 sharing	 economy	transactions	 more	 intimate	 will	 also	 limit	 the	 effectiveness	 of	antidiscrimination	 law.	 	The	 lack	of	norms	against	 the	exercise	of	 sex	
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Risking	Retaliation:	Events	Following	Interpersonal	Mistreatment	in	the	Workplace,	8	J.	OCC.	HEALTH	PSYCH.	247,	249	(2003).	
	 226.	 Id.	(quoting	research	subject).	
	 227.	 See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	225,	at	14-20.	
	 228.	 See	supra	notes	223-225.	
	 229.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.1.	
	 230.	 See	 Deborah	 Brake,	 Retaliation,	 90	 MINN.	 L.	 REV.	 18,	 20,	 37	 n.58	 (2005)	(compiling	studies	showing	that	“[f]ear	of	retaliation	is	the	leading	reason	why	people	stay	silent	instead	of	voicing	their	concerns	about	bias	and	discrimination”).	
	 231.	 See	 Blackstone,	 supra	 note	 223,	 at	 635	 (collecting	 studies	 finding	 that	 the	presence	of	coworker	bonds	is	associated	with	lower	incidence	of	discrimination).	
46	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	preferences	 in	 intimate	 settings	 will	 make	 any	 law	 that	 bans	 these	preferences	less	likely	to	be	enforced.		Because	antidiscrimination	law	is	 largely	 enforced	 through	 private	 rights	 of	 action,	 the	 violation	 of	norms	 will	 often	 be	 a	 necessary	 predicate	 to	 raising	 legal	consciousness	 and	 taking	 legal	 action.232	 	 And	 the	 fact	 that	 sharing	economy	 transactions	 take	 place	 in	 a	 private	 setting	 with	 little	monitoring	not	only	makes	the	operation	of	antidiscrimination	norms	less	 effective,	 but	 also	makes	 the	 operation	 of	 antidiscrimination	 law	less	 effective.233	 	 The	 decreased	 likelihood	 of	 detection	 lowers	 the	expected	 cost	 of	 non-compliance,	 making	 non-compliance	 more	likely.234		Scholars	have	posited	that	employers	themselves	can	and	do	play	a	significant	role	 in	 implementing	antidiscrimination	 law.235	 	But	firms	 will	 have	 a	 much	 harder	 time	 doing	 this	 in	 the	 case	 of	disaggregated	 and	 private	 transactions	 of	 the	 sharing	 economy	 that	take	place	without	any	workplace.	
4.	 New	Directions	While	 this	 Article	 does	 not	 take	 on	 the	 task	 of	 prescribing	 new	approaches	that	could	cure	the	legal	shortcomings	just	discussed,236	a	few	words	addressing	possible	 future	directions	 for	 law	are	 in	order.		First,	regulating	the	 information	on	which	buyers	and	sellers	can	rely	could	 successfully	 reduce	 discrimination	 while	 potentially	 better	fulfilling	preferences	of	buyers	and	sellers.		In	the	employment	context,	for	 example,	 limiting	 employers’	 access	 to	 information	 about	 a	prospective	 employee’s	 membership	 in	 a	 protected	 class	 is	 a	 key	strategy	 the	 law	 relies	 on	 to	 reduce	 discrimination	 at	 the	 hiring	stage.237	One	way	to	restrict	discrimination	in	the	sharing	economy	is	to	bar	buyers	 and	 sellers	 from	 learning	 the	 sex	 of	 prospective	 transacting	parties.	 	Banning	access	to	such	information	may	in	fact	lead	to	better	
                                                                                                             
	 232.	 See	Blackstone,	supra	note	223,	at	633-34.	
	 233.	 See	Strahilevitz,	supra	note	60,	at	1759-65.	
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	 235.	 See	 Cynthia	 Estlund,	 Rebuilding	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 Workplace	 in	 an	 Era	 of	 Self-
Regulation,	105	COLUM.	L.	REV.	319	(2005);	Sturm,	supra	note	61,	at	460.		 236.	 Future	work	will	explore	identity	preferences	and	discrimination	in	the	sharing	economy	and	will	have	more	to	say	on	this.	
	 237.	 See	generally	Naomi	Schoenbaum,	It’s	Time	That	You	Know:	The	Shortcomings	of	
Ignorance	 as	 Fairness	 in	 Employment	 Law	 and	 the	Need	 for	 an	 “Information-Shifting”	
Model,	 30	 HARV.	 J.L.	 &	 GENDER	 99	 (2007).	 	 Federal	 employment	 discrimination	 law	regards	 employers’	 preemployment	 inquiries	 regarding	 prospective	 employees’	protected	trait	status	as	evidence	of	discrimination,	and	some	state	law	prohibits	such	inquires.		Id.	at	137.	
2016]	 GENDER	AND	THE	SHARING	ECONOMY	 47	fulfillment	 of	 the	 preferences	 of	 transacting	 parties,	 as	 they	 can	 no	longer	rely	on	sex	as	a	proxy	for	the	traits	they	seek,	and	must	rely	on	other	 information	 that	may	 prove	 to	 be	more	 highly	 correlated	with	the	traits	they	are	seeking.		For	example,	if	a	buyer	or	seller	is	looking	for	a	transacting	party	who	will	provide	a	more	intimate	transaction	by	sharing	personal	 information,	 it	will	 likely	be	more	effective	to	seek	a	person	with	this	trait	rather	than	to	rely	on	female	sex	as	a	proxy	for	this	 trait.	 Self-disclosure	 or	 reviews	 by	 other	 users	 could	 reveal	information	 about	 such	 traits.238	 	 Prohibiting	 access	 to	 information	about	gender	might	be	enough	to	spur	sharing	economy	firms	to	make	available	other	information	on	which	transacting	parties	could	rely	to	satisfy	their	preferences.		If	not,	the	law	might	come	up	with	incentives	for	firms	to	do	so.	Another	 approach	 to	 addressing	 discrimination	 in	 the	 sharing	economy	 would	 place	 a	 legal	 obligation	 on	 firms	 not	 to	 cultivate	 or	reinforce	 discriminatory	 preferences	 of	 transacting	 parties.	 	 Scholars	have	begun	to	explore	proposals	to	this	effect	in	other	contexts	in	the	traditional	 economy,239	 and	 one	 could	 imagine	 that	 this	 type	 of	proposal	 could	 be	 extended	 to	 the	 sharing	 economy.	 	 In	 fact,	 the	technology	 on	which	 sharing	 economy	 firms	 rely	would	mitigate	 the	burden	of	 complying	with	such	a	mandate.	 	The	 fact	 that	users	select	and	 review	 transacting	 parties	 online	 makes	 it	 easy	 for	 firms	 to	monitor	 the	 behavior	 of	 their	 users	 through	 algorithms	 that	 would	track	 whether	 users	 were	 disproportionately	 acting	 on	 sex	 (e.g.,	 by	rejecting	or	negatively	reviewing	transacting	parties	of	one	sex	or	the	other).240	 	Although	 the	 tracking	of	user	conduct	by	sharing	economy	firms	 might	 raise	 privacy	 concerns,241	 there	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 a	
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	 240.	 See	id.	at	1733-34	(proposing	use	of	algorithms	to	weed	out	malicious	feedback	in	“How’s	My	Driving”	system).	
	 241.	 See	Davidson	&	Infranca,	supra	note	6,	at	18	n.109.	
48	 FORDHAM	URB.	L.J.	 [Vol.	XLIII	strong	 privacy	 interest	 in	 this	 non-intimate	 information,242	 and	 the	interest	 in	rooting	out	discrimination	would	 likely	trump	any	interest	in	privacy.	
CONCLUSION	New	 technologies	 can	 bring	with	 them	 hope	 about	 transformative	possibilities	 for	 the	 future.	 	And	while	 innovations	may	 contribute	 to	significant	 progress	 of	 all	 sorts,	 including	 for	 gender	 equality	 we	should	 be	 skeptical	 that	 technological	 progress	 inevitably	 leads	 to	progress	of	other	sorts.243		But	note	that	the	sharing	economy	may	also	give	us	reason	to	be	optimistic.	 	The	pervasiveness	of	 intimacy	across	the	 sharing	 economy	 could	 provide	 the	 motivation	 that	 spurs	innovative	 regulatory	 responses	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 combatting	discrimination	 in	 intimate	spaces,	which	would	be	beneficial	not	only	in	 the	 sharing	 economy,	 but	 across	 all	 intimate	 transactions	 in	 the	economy.		
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